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The late 1700s saw the birth of a new nation, one guided by the principles of liberty and freedom.  A 
group of thirteen independent colonies chose to form a close union in an attempt to rid themselves of 
the tyranny associated with monarchical rule.  Once these colonies had obtained their autonomy with 
the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, this new country entered into the era of constitution writing 
and compromise.  The process of unification however, proved to be a task perhaps just as daunting for 
Americans as the Revolution itself.  Even with guidance from statesmen who are now placed within the 
pantheon of American history, less than 100 years later the United States saw civil war rage across the 
continent.  By the time the most cataclysmic event in the history of the Western Hemisphere had 
concluded, 620,000 Americans had perished.1  How did a country who was founded in the principles of 
compromise, find itself on the brink of ruin and disunion in the 1860s?  As historian Elizabeth R. Varon 
argued, “The era of constitution making bequeathed to the young nation not only a legacy of 
compromise and indecision on slavery, but also the beginnings of a discourse in which politicians 
summoned images of disunion to advance their own regional and partisan agendas.”2  
 The technique of threatening secession is not a uniquely American idea however, as Roman 
politicians politicized and used the threat of secession five separate times between 494 BC and 287 BC 
(these events were deemed the Secessio Plebis).3  American statesmen during the 18th and 19th century 
were often trained in the Roman classics, and the concept of secession was not as foreign an idea as 
perhaps previously thought.  What did distinguish the American concept of secessionism and make it 
markedly different from previous (and even future) interpretations were the constant changing and 
reshaping of the ideology itself.  By this notion, politicians (both North and South) had attached their 
 
1
 Keegan, John. The American Civil War. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2009. 
 
2 Varon, Elizabeth R. Disunion: The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789-1859. The University of North Carolina Press, 
2008. Pg. 32. 
3Loewenstein, K. The Governance of Rome. Springer Science & Business Media, 1973. Pg. 22. 
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own spins on the idea of secession to further advance their own political end goals. From its inception 
the United States has flirted with secessionist theory, and while Southern states like South Carolina take 
the brunt of criticism for such ideologies, that interpretation of events is somewhat lacking. Decades 
before the American Civil War men like Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Timothy Pickering and 
Aaron Burr engaged in political dealings that were just as incendiary as their mid-19th century Southern 
brethren. 
 In recent years, Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina has often times been synonymous 
with secession (see works like Robert Elder’s John C. Calhoun: American Heretic), himself seen as the 
primary influence for secessionist thought leading up to the American Civil War.  This viewpoint, 
however, is only partly correct.  While Calhoun and his now legendary constitutional dissections were 
obviously some of the more prevalent antebellum anti-unionist doctrine, the root of secessionist 
thought does not begin nor end with the “South's Favorite Son”.  While the South’s decision to secede 
is by far the most notable example of true secessionism in American history, it is not the first, nor is 
secession a distinctly Southern idea.   
To fully grasp how the United States found itself embroiled in a conflict with itself in the 1860s, 
one must first account for the constitutional theory presented by Calhoun’s predecessors.  With the 
North’s victory, secession and nullification took on the designation of being “anti-American” ideals 
pinned to the Confederate movement.  In actuality, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison first explored 
the topic in the late 18th century after confessing their displeasure with the Adams administration.  
Their Resolutions each respectively propelled the states’ rights argument to the forefront of the 
American consciousness.  Their writings begged the question; is the United States a unified country, or 
a collection of states working in harmony that can choose to leave the Union if that harmony is ever 
threatened? 
At the same time that the Virginia dynasty first flirted with disunion, a group of disaffected men 
from the Northeastern seaboard considered the prospect of  establishing a new union formed out of 
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New England. This collection of rhetoric spewing and at times volatile men, became known as the 
Essex Junto. In the coming years, Federalists like Timothy Pickering, George Cabot and Harrison Gray 
Otis in New England considered the possibility of secession during the War of 1812.  Federalists 
pursued politics that were distinctly anglophile and focused heavily on international trade, and the 
outbreak of war seriously threatened both their political ideals and economic standing.  Americans 
expected a quick victory, but numerous military setbacks soon evaporated the idea of a quick war.  
Shipping across New England virtually stopped, and the economies of New England coastal cities 
suffered greatly.  In response, Federalists (and their more extreme Essex Junto counterparts) organized 
the Hartford Convention, which was held in Connecticut.  Federalist leaders met there to discuss what 
their response to war should be, and while secession was perhaps never explicitly mentioned, it has 
become a point of contention among historians as to how close the Northeastern states actually came to 
exiting the Union.   
The decision by the framers of the Constitution to not explicitly state what the nature of the 
American Union was, directly led to the issues that arose in the mid-1800s. Never was the question 
answered as to whether our nation was one and indivisible, or whether our arrangement was but a 
confederacy of individual states who operated more like a partnership. If the later interpretation was 
ascribed to, then it was no wonder as to why states’ felt they had the right to secede if they believed the 
union no longer benefited them. To not truly define how your country is organized at the very 
beginning, was without a doubt quite the oversight by the early founders of this nation. 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold; to both trace the seeds of secessionist thought back to the 
late 18th century, and by doing so prove that it is not a strictly 19th century Southern concept, as well as 
to convey how John C. Calhoun was influenced by earlier American statesmen and not the original 
architect of  the political ideology. Additionally, this paper’s aim is to identify early American 
secessionist movements in an attempt to dispel the myth that secessionist theory in the 1860s was 
novel. To fully realize the role that secessionism played in early American politics, the tracing of said 
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ideologies must be made as far back as the late 1700s. Early statemen and constitution writers from this 
period like Jefferson, Madison and Pickering served (as this thesis describes), as the primary 
influencers of later American politicians. Nullification and Secession have continuously been used as 
political tools throughout the history of the United States, and as such, they should not be attributed 
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Chapter One: The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 
 Even during its infancy, the United States flirted with the notion of disunion.  By 1790, the early 
nation already found itself embroiled in political affairs that would require a compromise.  The 
American Revolution had taken its toll on the Northeastern United States, and wartime debts had risen 
to an alarming level.  New Englanders pushed for a policy of assumption (federal government assumes 
debt held by states) to be the official stance of the newly established government.  Southerners, 
however, had already paid off their wartime debts and viewed the plan as biased to the North.4  
Alexander Hamilton was in favor of assumption and took a special interest in obtaining government aid 
for his constituents in New England.   
 Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were the voices of the South, as both men hailed from the 
State of Virginia.  Jefferson was of the mind that Northerners viewed assumption as a “sine qua non of 
a continuance of the Union”, and that a compromise was surely needed.5 Seeing assumption as 
something vital to the continuance of the union itself seems extreme, and it certainly was. Using this 
threat however, gave Northerners the upper hand in political disagreements, as not many in the 
fledgling United States were interested in war. At this juncture, disunion was but a whisper on the lips 
of American statesmen, not the feverous shout that it would later become in the 19th century.  The 
threat, however, was still present and a compromise was eventually reached.  A policy of assumption 
was undertaken by the United States, in exchange for a relocation of the capital to Virginia.   
After this early crisis had passed, Jefferson had already noted how the threat of disunion could 
sway political issues.  Writing on what had transpired, Jefferson stated, “It was unjust, in itself 
oppressive to the states, and was acquiesced in merely from a fear of disunion, while our government 
 
4Ellis, Joseph J. Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation. Knopf Doubleday Publishing, 2003. Pg. 55. 
5 Varon, Pg. 32. 
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was still in its most infant state. It enabled Hamilton so to strengthen himself by corrupt services to 
many that he could afterwards carry his bank scheme.”6  Jefferson realized that Hamilton (and 
Federalists alike) had used the whispers of disunion as an effective tool in deciding the outcome of the 
assumption crisis. 
 This episode was just the first of the many political battles that took place between Federalists 
and Republicans during the early days of the Union.  George Washington was alarmed by the 
emergence of regional interests and called for a stronger devotion to the Union.  Washington called 
upon his fellow Americans in hopes that, “Local sentiments be replaced by a sacred attachment to the 
Union and the Constitution.”7  Despite Washington's best efforts to remedy the growing situation and 
his sanguine outlook in regards to the future of the United States, the “American Experiment” was 
tested  again only two years after his farewell address.  Once again, Thomas Jefferson found himself at 
the center of the growing disunionist movement, even if he himself was by no means an advocate of 
true disunion.   
 In 1796, John Adams secured the presidency after a close race with former Secretary of State 
Thomas Jefferson.  Adams was part of the Federalist Party, a party that identified and wanted to align 
themselves with England rather than France.  Federalists also preferred a strong central government, 
manufacturing and banks. Adams's presidency proved to be nothing short of tumultuous, and by 1797 
the United States had found itself in a political stalemate with France.  Federalist doctrine maintained 
the want for a strong centralized government, and the recent revolution in France in 1789 caused anti-
Franco sentiment to grow throughout the Federalist ranks.8  This culminated in first, the XYZ Affair, in 
which French officials refused to meet with an American diplomatic envoy composed of John 
Marshall, Charles Pickney and Elbridge Gerry, unless certain monetary bribes were made.9  The United 
 
6Library of Congress, The Thomas Jefferson Papers Series 2. General Correspondence. 1651-1827 
7Garrity, Patrick J. A Sacred Union of Citizens: George Washington's Farewell Address and the American Character. 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. Pg. 85. 
8Neely, Sylvia. A Concise History of the French Revolution. Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. Pg. 100. 
9Ferling, John. John Adams: A Life. Knoxville, Tennessee. University of Tennessee Press, 1992. Pg. 363. 
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States refused, and a Quasi-War (or Half-War as John Adams refereed to it) broke out between the two 
countries.10  Anti-French feeling was rapidly growing, and Thomas Jefferson as well his Republican 
constituents were accused of supporting the enemy.  Federalists even charged Republicans with inciting 
rural farmers to rise up against a strong government, in conjunction with ideas spread during the French 
Revolution.  Federalists truly believed that Republicans would stop nothing short of disunion in their 
attempt to disrupt and belittle the Federalist agenda. The topic of disunion was once again at the 
forefront of American political discourse and ideological thought, even though the country itself was 
less than a quarter-century old. 
 By May of 1798, party tension had reached a fever pitch.  Federalists and Republicans began to 
battle not only in the political arena, but in the streets of major cities as well.  Philadelphia was one 
such city that experienced the violence associated with political rivalry.  A popular printer named 
Benjamin Franklin Bache was known for his anti-Federalist rhetoric that he routinely included in his 
paper the Aurora.  The critiques were deemed serious enough by administration supporters, that on 
May 9th a large group of Federalists marched on Bache's home with intent to burn his home to the 
ground.  Although the mob was unsuccessful, the event nonetheless influenced future Adams 
administration policies.11  Most notably, in an attempt to silence their Republican critics, the Federalists 
and John Adams issued the Alien and Sedition Acts.   
 The Alien and Sedition Acts were a set of four laws that were catered towards disrupting anti-
administration actions in the United States.  The first act known as the Naturalization Act increased the 
residency requirement to become a citizen from five years to fourteen years.  This in effect, also gave 
the federal government full control in all citizenship affairs, with individual states being forced to 
relinquish that right.  The Alien Friends Act (which was deemed as the most heinous of the new laws) 
allowed President John Adams to jail or deport any foreigners that were suspected of “anti-American” 
 
10McCullough, David. John Adams. Simon and Shuster, 2008. Pg. 178. 
11Halperin, Terri Diane. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798: Testing the Constitution. JHU Press, 2016. PG. 2. 
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activities.  The Alien Enemies Act expanded upon the Alien Friends Act, but would only be in effect if 
the United States formally declared war.  These acts not only granted President Adams with somewhat 
unchecked power, but also denied immigrants the right to a fair trial.12   
 All three of these new laws were directed at foreigners, but the Sedition Act was directly aimed 
at United States citizens.  The Sedition Act made it illegal for citizens to speak or write in opposition to 
the Adams administration, virtually revoking Habeas Corpus.13  While in modern times this decision 
would be immediately deemed as unconstitutional, in 1798 a crisis such as this one had not yet 
occurred and therefore, no precedent existed.  The Alien and Sedition Acts were supported by a number 
of politicians and political groups, mostly due to the malicious literature being printed in regards to the 
Adams administration.  For example, in the same year that the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed 
George Washington wrote a letter to Timothy Pickering (his former Secretary of State) detailing his 
negative opinions on anti-Adams papers, “But more the views of those who are opposed to the 
measures of our Government are developed, the less surprised I am at the attempt and the means, 
cowardly, illiberal and assassin [sic] like, which are used to subvert it; and to destroy all confidence in 
those who are entrusted with the Administration thereof.”14   
 Supporters of the Acts often justified their stance by claiming that no harm could come from 
silencing writings that were nothing but lies.  This sentiment was shared by Connecticut Congressman 
John Allen (a prominent Federalist and ardent supporter of the Adams Administration) who argued that 
the Alien and Sedition Acts were constitutional because they would only affect those found guilty of 
slander, “Am I free to falsely call you a thief, a murderer, a person who does not believe in God? The 
freedom of press and opinions was never understood to give the right of printing lies and slanders, nor 
 
12 Halperin, Pg. 6. 
13  Robertson, Andrew W. “‘Look on This Picture... And on This!" Nationalism, Localism, and Partisan Images of Otherness 
in the United States, 1787-1820.” The American Historical Review, vol. 106, no. 4, 2001, Pg. 1263–1280. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/2692948. 
14Washington to Timothy Pickering. Library of Congress. Feb. 6th, 1798. 
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of calling for revolution and slaughter.”15  These arguments (even though they were made by influential 
politicians) fell on deaf ears when presented to their Republican rivals.  The backlash to the Alien and 
Sedition Acts was severe, as Republicans accused Federalists of disregarding the Constitution in an 
attempt to discredit their political opponents.  Albert Gallatin (who in 1798 was a member of the House 
of Representatives) was a noted Republican and vocal critic of the “unconstitutional” practices being 
enabled by the second President.  In response to the acts, Gallatin spoke before congress and claimed 
that, 
This bill makes anyone speaking or writing against the present Administration an 
enemy of the Constitution.  If you put the press under any such restraint, you thus 
deprive the people of the means of getting the facts about their government and 
make the right of free elections worthless.  This bill must be considered only as a 
weapon to be used by the party in power in order to keep their authority and present 
place.16 
 
 Even the American public responded with defiance to the Adams Administration.  As historian 
Douglas Bradburn states, “On the same day, Adams was hanged and burned in effigy in front of the 
meeting house in North Stamford, Connecticut, deep in the Federalist heartland.”17  In areas where 
Federalism was the dominant political movement, citizens were still taken aback by the Acts. James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson were both equally as appalled by the new set of laws put into effect by 
the Adams Administration.  Both statesmen quickly wrote each other to determine in what way they 
could obstruct the passing of the Alien and Sedition Acts.  In a letter to James Madison from June 7th, 
1798, Jefferson outlines his fears and summarizes why the new Acts were inherently unconstitutional.  
The third president was alarmed that the Acts would “place aliens not protected by treaties under 
absolute government.” This fear of an unchecked federal government caused political tensions not only 
at this time, but also in the years leading up to the American Civil War as well.18  The letter to Madison 
 
15Annals of Congress, 5th Congress, 2nd Session, Pg. 2097-2098. 
16Annals of Congress, 5th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 2110. 
17 Bradburn, Douglas. “A Clamor in the Public Mind: Opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts.” The William and Mary 
Quarterly, vol. 65, no. 3, 2008, pp. 565–600. 
18Jefferson to Madison. Library of Congress. June 7th, 1798. 
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also makes it a point to highlight how the Sedition Bill was not only an abuse of power, but how it 
bypassed rights already guaranteed in the Constitution, like that of freedom of speech.  Jefferson 
personally believed that the Alien and Sedition Acts were, “both so palpably in the teeth of the 
Constitution as to shew they mean to pay no respect to it.” This sentiment of challenging the federal 
government when their implied powers overstretch their boundaries is one that future secessionists 
would cite during the 1850s and 1860s. 
 In direct response to the Alien and Sedition Acts, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Kentucky 
Resolution. This paper provided the groundwork for later secessionist thought. While perhaps not as 
drastic as true secession, here was a future President of the United States essentially diminishing the 
power of the federal government.  The Kentucky Resolution served as a direct rebuttal to the contents 
of the Alien and Sedition Acts.  Jefferson and Madison both believed that the newly established Acts 
exceeded the clearly defined powers given to the president and Congress in the Constitution.  By 
October of 1798, Jefferson had finished his first draft of the legendary document, and its contents 
would provide a foothold for future nullifiers like John C. Calhoun (even if this was not explicitly 
Jefferson's intention).19   
 To fully understand the impact that the Kentucky Resolution had on later American statesmen, 
one must survey and study the constitutional theory presented throughout the document.  Explicitly 
stated in the first line of the document, Jefferson certainly does not mince his words when he wrote 
that, “Resolved, that the several states composing the United States of America, are not united on the 
principle of unlimited submission to their General Government.”  This theme of disallowing the federal 
government access to unchecked power is one of the recurring issues examined by Jefferson, and later 
Madison.  The fear of early American statesmen was that states' rights would be trampled by the federal 
government, if the latter were left unrestrained.  There was at this time, no true precedent to handle 
 
19Warfield, Ethelbert Dudley. The Kentucky Resolution of 1798: A Historical Study. G.P. Putnam's Sons, University of 
California Davis. 1887. Pg, 163. 
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situations such as this, and political leaders such as Jefferson had to essentially develop their own 
constitutional theory.  Although the Resolutions were essentially disregarded when they were written, 
they still presented ideas that were, and still are, worthy of study.  As historian William J. Watkins Jr. 
stated, “the Resolutions cogent reasoning won acceptance in the marketplace of ideas.”20 
 The Resolution continued by claiming that when the general government assumed powers not 
explicitly stated in the Constitution, that state governments had the right to announce their acts as null 
and void.21  Not only were the acts deemed as void, but the ability of Congress to create, punish, or 
define crimes was also in question, since this power was not fully discussed in the Constitution.  
Jefferson's language throughout the first part of the Kentucky Resolution is notable due partly to his 
choice of words.  Instead of referring to the United States as one entity or country, he solely addressed 
the country using the term “co-states”.  This differentiation is crucial; interpreting the government of 
the United States as a confederacy or compact of independent autonomous states gives each individual 
state the perceived right to both nullify federal law (if they are in disagreement) or in extreme cases, 
choose to leave the “union” formed with the other states. 
 Part three of the Kentucky Resolution examines the right of free speech, and how the Adams 
Administration was infringing upon one of the essential American virtues.  In response to the Sedition 
Act Jefferson wrote, “Resolved that it is true as a general principle and is also expressly declared by 
one of the amendments to the constitution that the powers not delegated to the United States by the 
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people.”22  
This was yet another strong backing of states' rights by Jefferson and this particular line would reappear 
numerous times throughout the Kentucky Resolution.  If this sentiment were to have been true, then 
 
20Watkins Jr., William J. Reclaiming the American Revolutions: The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions and their Legacy. 
Palgrave Macmillan. New York, 2004. Pg. 117. 
21 Bird, Wendell. “Reassessing Responses to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: New Evidence from the Tennessee and 
Georgia Resolutions and from Other States.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 35, no. 4, 2015. 
22 Jefferson, Thomas. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Volume 30: January 1, 1798 to January 31, 1799. Princeton 
University Press, 2003. 
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that means that the federal government would virtually have had no implied powers.  Jefferson and his 
Republican followers were strict constitutionalists, meaning that if something was not explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution that they were to disregard it.  This extremely strict understanding of the 
Constitution and anti-centralization of power (things that Jefferson himself would ignore during the 
purchase of Louisiana) influenced statesmen for generations to come, such as John Randolph of 
Roanoke and of course, John C. Calhoun.23  In general, Republicans were conservative in their 
interpretation of the Constitution, and the ideas presented in the years leading up to the “Revolution of 
1800”, remained central to Republican thought throughout the first half of the 19th century. 
 Thomas Jefferson was certainly more explicit in his attack on the administration than other 
Republicans, and his somewhat “extreme” ideas were not shared by all of his constituents.  To fully 
grasp Jefferson's viewpoint, his draft of the Kentucky Resolution should be examined more carefully 
than the final edit, because perhaps it was the more important of the two documents. By part eight of 
the Kentucky Resolution, one cannot but notice the contrast between his draft and the final copy.  The 
draft examines in more detail, the idea of a compact and the concept of nullification.  In regard to once 
again identifying the United States as not a centralized government but a compact, Jefferson wrote, 
That a committee of conference and correspondence be appointed, who shall have 
in charge to communicate the preceding resolutions to the legislatures of the several 
States; to assure them that this commonwealth continues in the same esteem of their 
friendship and union which it has manifested from that moment at which a common 
danger first suggested a common union: that it considers union, for specified 
national purposes, and particularly to those specified in their late federal compact, 
to be friendly to the peace, happiness and prosperity of all the States: that faithful to 
that compact, according to the plain intent and meaning in which it was understood 
and acceded to by the several parties, it is sincerely anxious for its preservation.24 
 
Let us not forget, Jefferson and Madison were among the leaders of the Revolution, a war that came 
about in response to the perceived tyranny of Great Britain. John Adams ascribed to British upper-class 
sensibilities in many ways, and wanted the presidency to follow precedents (in regard to status, not 
 
23 Carson, David A. “That Ground Called Quiddism: John Randolph's War with the Jefferson Administration. “Journal of 
American Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, 1986, pp. 71–92. 
24Jefferson, Thomas. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: 1795-1801. G.P. Putnam's Sons. 1896. Pg. 470. 
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governmental function) set by the British crown. It cannot be much of a surprise then, that Adams was 
challenged the same way King George III was decades before. This draft yet again made it clear that 
the United States (to Jefferson), was a group of autonomous governments that came together in an 
attempt to dispel a “common danger”.  This time however, the common danger arose within the country 
itself and threatened to put on a halt on the American experiment.  Jefferson went on to write that a 
union developed to protect national interests should be preserved for the common peace. 
 Jefferson may not have been openly advocating a true secessionist movement, but his wording 
at certain points in the Kentucky Resolution were at the very least open to interpretation.  Following his 
call for a “preservation” of the union, the future president immediately thereafter presented the concept 
of nullification.  After taking aim at the administration and claiming that the Alien and Sedition Acts 
were not for the peace or prosperity of the union, Jefferson took his argument a step further.  In a 
section of the Kentucky Resolution that was omitted from the final version, Jefferson wrote, 
 
That it does also believe, that to take from the States all the powers of self-
government and transfer them to a general and consolidated government, without 
regard to the special delegations and reservations solemnly agreed to in that 
compact, is not for the peace, happiness or prosperity of these States; and that 
therefore this commonwealth is determined, as it doubts not its co-States are, to 
submit to undelegated, and consequently unlimited powers in no man, or body of 
men on earth: that in cases of an abuse of the delegated powers, the members of the 
General Government, being chosen by the people, a change by the people would be 
the constitutional remedy; but, where powers are assumed which have not been 
delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy: that every State has a 
natural right in cases not within the compact, (casus non foederis) to nullify of their 
own authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits: that without 
this right, they would be under the dominion, absolute and unlimited, of whosoever 
might exercise this right of judgment for them.25 
 
This is undoubtedly the most crucial section of the draft, for it explicitly mentions the theory of 
nullification.  It is here that Jefferson's ideas were almost too extreme for even his closest constituents, 
including James Madison.  According to historian Jeff Broadwater, “Jefferson's words put Madison on 
the defensive. In a letter to Nicholas Trist, he tried to explain Jefferson's more radical ideas as an 
 
25Jefferson, Thomas. Jefferson's Draft: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 30: 1 January 1798 to 31 January 1799. 
Princeton University Press. 2003.  
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example of his friend's tendency to overstate his case.”26  Madison (who later sponsored and wrote the 
Virginia Resolution) still found his friend's wording to be too strong. 
 Jefferson never advocated secession as a political strategy, yet he is the one who brought the 
concept of nullification to the forefront of American political thought.  Fear of a consolidated 
unchecked government forced the hand of Jefferson into writing such an intriguing, yet, “overstated” 
piece.  In still another attempt to defend his political ally, Madison claimed that the Kentucky 
Resolution did not prescribe nullification as a constitutional right, but as a natural law.27  Regardless of 
Jefferson's original intent, this section of the Kentucky Resolution was later used as doctrine for 
nullifiers in the 1830s.  In his speech in support of nullification, Robert Y. Hayne (one of John C. 
Calhoun's main followers) for example wrote, “Sir, South Carolina has not gone one step further than 
Mr. Jefferson himself was disposed to go in relation to the present subject of our present complaints.”28  
This simple line in Hayne’s speech illustrated how Jefferson’s early writings on nullification later 
influenced Southern “Fire-Eaters”.  
 The Kentucky Resolution finished with a more concise statement of its main objectives.  The 
Resolution was written in defense of states' rights and that (presumably) states, “…will each take 
measures of its own for providing that neither these acts nor any others of the general government not 
plainly and intentionally authorized by the constitution shall be exercised within their respective 
territories.”29  Most historians have come to the consensus that the Kentucky Resolution failed in its 
aim to unite the states against the Alien and Sedition Acts. States like Delaware, Maryland and Vermont 
chose not to discuss the validity of the Alien and Sedition Acts; they strictly reviewed whether state law 
could supersede federal law. Each of those states determined that at this juncture of American history, 
 
26Broadwater, Jeff. James Madison: A Son of Virginia and a Founder of the Nation. UNC Press Books. 2012. Pg. 204. 
27Broadwater, Pg. 205. 
28  Brewer, David Josiah. World's Best Orations from the Earliest Period to Present Time: Volume 7. Kaiser Publishing. 
1900. PG. 2446. 
29Jefferson, Thomas. Resolutions Adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly:  The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 30: 
1 January 1798 to 31 January 1799. Princeton University Press. 2003. 
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states’ rights should be held in check.  Vermont went as far as to declare that the Resolutions were not 
only unconstitutional, but also dangerous to the nature of the Union.  Historian Stanley Elkins summed 
up the states’ reaction to the Resolutions, stating that ten states outright condemned them, while four 
(Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina) chose not to respond.30  Adrienne Koch for 
example, wrote that the Kentucky Resolution, “...appeared on the surface to be nothing more than two 
impersonal messages from two apparently eloquent Southern assemblies, asking for corroboration from 
their several sister states. With no exceptions, the immediate comment was hostile.”31 Koch believed 
that although the Resolution may have technically failed in its attempt to garner support from other 
states in the union, “As political propaganda, however, the Resolutions were tremendously effective, 
frightening the Federalist ranks, and uniting, as Hamilton feared they might, the Republicans into a 
determined party with body and solidity.”   
This same sentiment is not shared by all historians however, as some perceive Jefferson's 
writings to have been more successful than originally thought.  Historian Wendell Bird believed the 
consensus that all states outright rejected the Resolution may not be true.  According to him, the only 
states that immediate declined were the “New England and some middle states.”32  As for the Southern 
states, Bird believes that the reaction was not hostile to the resolutions at all.  In fact, he declares the 
exact opposite.  Georgia and Tennessee are believed to have explicitly rejected the Sedition Acts, and 
asked for their repeal. 
In Tennessee, Governor John Sevier brought the Resolutions to the legislature with haste; 
Federalism had little presence in Tennessee and the Republican legislature immediately condemned the 
Alien and Sedition Acts.  Republican newspapers across the country were overjoyed to report that the 
Acts proposed by the Adams Administration had met the same fate in Tennessee as they did in 
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Kentucky and Virginia.  After Tennessee held a joint committee to discuss the Kentucky Resolution, the 
Volunteer State passed its own resolutions in concert with Jefferson’s writings. The Tennessee 
Resolution read as follows,  
Resolved, that it shall be and hereby is enjoined an instruction to the Senators 
and Representatives of the State of Tennessee in the Congress of the United 
States to use their best effort in their respective powers, to procure at the present 
session of Congress, a repeal of an act of Congress of the United States, 
entitled, “An act concerning aliens,” passed on the twenty second of June, in the 
year one thousand seven hundred and ninety eight, and also a repeal of one 
other act of the Congress of the United States, entitled, “An act, in addition to 
an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, passed on 
the 14th day of July, in the year 1798, upon the ground that the said acts are in 
several parts opposed to the constitution, and are impolitic, oppressive, and 
unnecessary.33 
 
Although there is contention among historians in regard to state response to the Kentucky Resolution, 
the response from Tennessee illustrates that Jefferson’s writings had their desired effects on certain 
parts of the country. The Tennessee legislature made it explicitly known that their response was indeed, 
directly influenced by the Kentucky Resolution.  Shortly after, Georgia followed suit and drafted their 
own resolutions in regard to the Alien and Sedition Acts.  The Georgian committee, “hoped that they 
(the Alien and Sedition Acts) will be repealed without a necessity for the legislature of Georgia to enter 
into violent resolutions against them.”34  This wording invoked a spirit of armed resistance, and many 
political leaders in Georgia were wary that the language was simply too strong for the occasion.   
The next day, the committee voted to remove that section of their resolution, in an attempt to 
produce a more conciliatory document.  Nonetheless, these early records of the proceedings show the 
underlying theme behind most of the deliberations; Federal laws that encroach on civil liberty (if not 
properly addressed) can be met with violent dissent.  This is not to say that Civil War was imminent, 
but it does illustrate how the concept of secession was always lingering.  As aforementioned however, 
the final Georgia Resolution discarded much of the hostile language from the first draft,   
That to advise an approbation of those acts, as some states seem to have done, 
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would be to speak a language foreign to their hearts; but the committee hopes 
that they will be repealed without the interposition of the state legislature; they 
cannot, however, forbear expressing their sentiments on them, so far as to 
declare, that if the American government had no greater hold on the people’s 
allegiance and fidelity, than those acts, it would not rest on that firm foundation 
which the committee hope and trust it does and ever will, on the affection of the 
citizens over whom it presides; riveted by the acts of a wise and virtuous 
administration. 
 
While the Georgia and Tennessee Resolutions were certainly more conciliatory than their counterparts, 
they still addressed some of the questions regarding the role of the Constitution in the infancy of the 
United States. Less than 20 years after the conclusion of the American Revolution, the questions of 
secession and union versus confederacy had already entered the realm of American political discourse.  
The four states who first explored this realm of constitutional theory were all similar in one way; they 
were all Southern.  Secessionism is generally identified as a Southern concept, especially in the years 
surrounding the American Civil War.  This categorization of the South as the original and only 
proponents of secession is only partly true.  While the Civil War was fought over geographical lines, 
the concept of exiting the union has never been a North versus South issue.  New England is often 
viewed as the hotbed of American patriotism, yet in the early parts of the 19th century, secessionism 



















Chapter Two: The Rise of the Essex Junto and the Role of Aaron Burr 
 
By the start of the 19th century, the United States was still but an infant nation looking to make 
its mark on the world stage.  In the early years after the American Revolution, two major political 
parties came to fruition, the Federalists and the Republicans.  The Federalist Party was headed by 
Alexander Hamilton and placed an emphasis on a strong central government, a Constitution that could 
be left to interpretation, a focus on manufacturing and the development of  pro-British sentiment to 
ensure the United States a role in international trade.  Federalism, according to historian James M. 
Banner Jr.,  
Offered a social ideal which emphasized stability, tradition, dependence, and the 
common good.  It fed upon provincial illusions and fears and expressed a powerful 
regional culture. To a people resentful of their state’s loss of influence and of their own 
standing within society, frightened by the specter of an unappalled revolution abroad, 
provoked by the domestic hostility of religious dissenters, factional adversaries, and 
men on the make, frustrated by the failure of their own revolution to bear out its 
promise, and simply unable to understand change. To these people the Federalist Party 
gave a powerful voice and held great appeal.35 
 
Federalism was synonymous with New England as a way of thinking, before it was ever consolidated 
into a political party.  New Englanders of every station found themselves attracted to the conservative 
ideology of Federalism.  Compared with other early states, Massachusetts experienced relative 
homogeneity amongst its citizens.36 Those who resided in the “Bay Colony” often traced their lineage 
back to the scores of revolutionary figures that presided there during the 18th century.  Men like John 
Hancock, John Adams and Sam Adams embraced the concepts of revolution and political 
consolidation.  Not only were those in Massachusetts linked by their predecessors, but also through 
religion and culture.  In the 1790’s, a dominating portion of New Englanders were of English descent, 
and were of the Protestant faith.37   
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While New England experienced relative homogeneity in regard to their political theory, one 
faction in particular pushed the limit of both the Constitution and the union itself. These men, who 
grew more and more disaffected with the general government, were known as the Essex Junto (Essex 
County, Massachusetts served as their namesake). The Essex Junto was a wing of Federalism whose 
radical interpretation of the Constitution undoubtedly effected later secessionist movements. Generally, 
John Adams is credited with the identification and naming of this short-lived yet incendiary branch of 
American political thought. However, the Essex Junto was actually first mentioned by John Hancock 
during the era of establishing state governments. As early as 1778, those extremists linked to Essex 
County were identified due to their displeasure directed at the prospect of Massachusetts establishing a 
“weak” centralized government. To those men that strove to take the governing power away from the 
people and place it in the hands of elected officials, the title of Essex Junto was attributed.  
The Essex Junto’s voice was truly first heard, during the vigorous debates over the proposed 
treaty with Great Britain in 1795.38  Known as Jay’s Treaty, this political event assisted in shaping and 
defining what Federalism ideology truly was.  In the years following the American Revolution, Europe 
found itself embroiled in yet another war.  This time it featured the classic rivals France and Britain.  
For a new nation like the United States, this spelled disaster.  Americans were caught between two 
warring superpowers and public opinion was either pro-French or pro-British.  
  As an infant nation the United States at times struggled to bolster its economy.  To make 
matters worse, Great Britain imposed a one-way tariff; British goods (which were often times cheaper 
than their American counterparts) could still be sold in the United States, while American exports were 
restricted by tariffs.   Other pertinent issues included American grievances over impressment of 
American sailors, seizure of American ship’s goods, and Great Britain’s refusal to vacate forts in North 
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America.39  The politician heading the negotiations was John Jay, who was personally selected by 
George Washington. This was, however, much to the dismay of the Essex Junto. They instead, had 
pushed for Alexander Hamilton to be the politician to head the negotiations with Great Britain. 
Washington was told that such a move was unwise by many of his constituents due to Hamilton’s 
overtly pro-British disposition. Washington’s Secretary of State Edmund Randolph advocated against 
Hamilton, and John Jay was chosen.40   
Jay’s career was long and distinguished; he served as an early anti-slavery voice, attended both 
the first and second Continental Congress meetings, and Chief Justice of the United States (a position 
he took after turning down Secretary of State).41  When war with Great Britain was becoming more and 
more of a reality in the mid-1790s, Jay’s experience seemingly made him the logical choice. His 
Federalist ties and preference of Great Britain over France made him indispensable to the deliberations.  
The United States wanted to remain neutral when it came to European wars, and John Jay was prepared 
to use his calling card.  The idea was for Jay to threaten Great Britain into making concessions by 
claiming that the United States would join other neutral European powers and defend their goods with 
force if necessary.  
 Alexander Hamilton was closely following the negotiations and decided to take matters into his 
own hands.  Hamilton disclosed to the British that this was only a scare tactic.  With no more serious 
bargaining chips, Jay was forced to accept a treaty that was rather unpopular throughout the United 
States.  When the treaty reached the Senate, it passed with a vote of 20 to 10.  Jay’s Treaty truly only 
garnered two concessions for Americans; the British had to abandon their forts in the Northwest (which 
was already supposed to happen) and the United States was given “favored nation status.” This new 
“status” allowed Americans to trade more freely with Great Britain, but the West Indies were still 
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restricted. The treaty failed to discuss most, if not all, of the more pressing matters between Great 
Britain and her former colonies.  Impressment, Native American relations, the Canadian-Maine 
boundary and the seizure of American ships were not directly addressed in the deliberations.  Jay’s 
Treaty, therefore, was met with outrage by most non-Federalists throughout the United States.  
Although the Essex Junto failed in their attempt to let Hamilton handle negotiations, Federalists 
nonetheless rejoiced; they had secured their partnership with Great Britain at the expense of France.  
The fear of a French-style Revolution occurring in American was a talking point among Federalists and 
for the moment, their concerns had been mediated.  Federalism was always linked to Great Britain from 
the early days of its inception as a political party, which is what made the upcoming war even more of a 
strain on the once strong Federalist Party. 
Even by the 1790s, many citizens in New England had grown disaffected with the Federal 
government.  The Virginia dynasty was alive and well, and three of the first four presidents called the 
“Old Dominion” their home.  Massachusetts always considered herself to be the other most influential 
state in the Union, yet many Federalists still felt that their concerns and ideals were not being given 
enough attention on the national stage.  This feeling of being isolated only increased the homogeneity 
discussed earlier between New Englanders.  New England had always seemingly operated on its own 
accord, and as one historian describes,  
Experience had demonstrated the need for a bond between government 
and citizen, but was not this government too distant? A government must 
hold the confidence of the people, but were New Englanders to respect a 
government with which they had only minimal contact and which was 
exposed to influence from the South and West? Such questions, joined 
with fears for the stability of the republic, gave rise as early as 
Washington’s first term to a concern that no government outside New 
England could retain the region’s loyalty and esteem.42       
 
As esteemed Federalist leader Fisher Ames put it, “the government is too far off to gain the affections 
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of the people.”43  Jay’s Treaty united Federalists as they tried to defeat their Francophile Republican 
opponents. The prospect of Jefferson as president was appalling to those with Junto leanings. To them, 
if Jefferson ever became president it would upset the balance of power between the Northeast and the 
South.  As early as 1796, a “split” in the union was already being discussed. Newspapers and authors 
alike, sowed the seeds of disunion by claiming that the Northern states were more than equipped to 
survive on their own. Some went as far as to claim that disunion was not only a possibility, but that it 
was confirmed. Invoking such images united early Federalists, even those that were not yet ready to 
delve completely into extremism. This united front resulted in the election of John Adams, who was the 
first and only Federalist politician to be elected president.   
John Adams’s presidency was and still is considered an abject failure in many respects. His 
inaction on many issues lead to not only issues with rival political party, but divisiveness among 
Federalists themselves. However, for the purpose of discussing the influence of the Essex Junto, a 
singular event from Adams’s term must be discussed. In the aftermath of Jay’s Treaty, the United 
States’ other potential ally France was more than displeased. John Adams, therefore, dispatched a 
commission to handle the proceedings in France and quell passions that were quickly rising on both 
sides. Adams’s selected committee was made up of politicians that had no real ties and no inclinations 
to support France (Marshall, Gerry, Pickney). The Essex Junto had already disapproved of the 
administration (they felt Adams was not extreme enough in his pursuance of Federalist theory), and 
their leaders used this as an opportunity to go on the attack.  
At the time, Hamilton argued that men with connections to France should be included in the 
envoy, men like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. “To be useful it is important that a man 
agreeable to the French should go. Either Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Madison should be on the committee, 
but neither should go alone.”44 An interesting admission by a Federalist leader, and the administration’s 
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refusal to send pro-France politicians to the negotiations drew the ire of the Essex Junto. Hamilton’s 
advice proved to be prudent; the negotiations never truly started let alone finished. Upon their arrival, 
the American diplomats were refused a meeting with anyone of note from the French government. 
Instead, they were met by unofficial Frenchmen using the pseudonyms X, Y, and Z. Essentially, X, Y, Z 
served more as extortioners than politicians.45 The French “commissioners” demanded a bribe in 
exchange for a meeting with actual French leaders, and after their refusal to do so, the American envoy 
ended negotiations. Adams decision to disregard Hamilton’s advice directly led to failure, and the 
Federalist Party was cracking. 
Public sentiment in New England became increasingly anti-French, and the prospect of war 
between America and their ally from the Revolution seemed more and more likely. When the idea of 
sending another envoy to France to settle their differences arose, the Essex Junto condemned any 
efforts to compromise. Federalists emboldened by the rash language of the Junto, fractured with John 
Adams over this issue. Adams knew that the nation was simply too young and unprepared to wage war 
with a European power, and consequentially drew the ire of high-ranking Federalists who disagreed 
with his peaceful approach.  
The reaction by the Essex Junto sent tremors though Adams’s cabinet; a mixture of resignations 
and dismissals left most of the cabinet positions vacated. Timothy Pickering (a favorite amongst the 
Junto) was dismissed from his post as Secretary of State and proceeded to attack the Adams 
administration for not upholding true Federalist doctrine. After his dismissal, Pickering wrote Hamilton 
voicing his displeasure and his desire to belittle the administration, “I have been contemplating the 
importance of a bold and frank exposure of Adams; perhaps I may have it in my power to furnish some 
facts.”46 Hamilton certainly agreed, and in 1800 published The Public Conduct and Character of John 
Adams, Esq., President of the United States. The papers proved to be scathing; accusing Adams of 
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lacking the necessary morality and of course, conspiring with France.47 Hamilton succeeded in turning 
Adams’s own party against him, and further solidified the Essex Junto’s position in the Federalist Party. 
John Adams took note of the Essex Junto’s obsession with anti-French rhetoric in the waning days of 
his presidency,  
They could not, or would not, distinguish between Jacobinism and 
neutrality. Everything with them was Jacobinism, except a war with 
France and an alliance with Great Britain. They all panted for a war 
between the United States and France as sincerely, though not as 
ardently, as Alexander Hamilton.48 
 
Fanaticism repeatedly leads to fissure within countries and even at this early juncture Adams identified 
that the Essex Junto’s political stances were capable of inciting treachery, or even starting a war. In the 
coming years, those Federalists with links to Essex County confirmed Adam’s prediction. 
 When John Adams’s tenure as President was abruptly over after just one term, the Republicans 
sponsored two candidates: Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr. Jefferson was seemingly the favorite, but 
the Essex Junto supported Burr in an effort to impede the growth of Jeffersonian Republicanism. The 
Federalist’s plan (since they knew John Adams was effectively out of the running), was to entice Burr 
to challenge Jefferson in return for Federalist support. Those who knew Aaron Burr were aware of his 
ambition, and his penchant for siding with whoever could help him elevate to new heights. High-
ranking Federalists knew that Burr would never truly encapsulate their political ideology; supporting 
Burr was simply another way to sow discontent in the Republican party. The Junto’s attempts at 
disrupting political dealings was noted by Hamilton, and he himself actually supported Jefferson. 
Jefferson held the favor of public sentiment and Hamilton realized that if the Junto elevated Burr to the 
presidency instead of the people’s choice it would be disastrous. The former Secretary of the Treasury’s 
influence cannot be understated, and after numerous ballots, Thomas Jefferson received the majority 
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and was elected president. For the time being, the Essex Junto’s plan to disrupt democracy was halted. 
 Once Jefferson was president, the Essex Junto realized that Hamilton was not a reliable leader 
and his favor waned in the more fervent sects of Federalism. Fisher Ames (a Federalist known for his 
oratory) voiced the displeasure with Hamilton that many in the Essex Junto were feeling, “The 
Federalists are already stigmatized as an oligarchy, as a British faction. Hamilton is obnoxious and 
persecuted by popular clamors, in which Federalists, to their shame, join.”49 Extremist Federalists now 
had two enemies, both Jefferson and their former leader Hamilton. The issue of territorial expansion 
always drew ire in New England, as they believed it belittled the Northeast’s power and scope. 
Members of the Junto went as far as to suggest a constitutional amendment aimed at dissuading the 
acquisition of territory as it would have upset the balance of power in the United States. The issue of 
slave representation was hotly contested; it is interesting to note that the first geographical area to call 
for disunion was not the South, but the Northeast.  
The Junto’s plans have always been somewhat understudied, however that is not for a lack of 
sources. The Junto preferred secrecy regarding their dealings, however, most people (even publicly) 
were aware of their deliberations. While the public knew the Essex Junto existed and rumors swirled 
across the Northeast, the true extent to which Federalists were flirting with disunion was never 
explicitly known. Newspapers in the Northeast who had at least some insight into their dealings, openly 
commented on the Junto, including this close to the chest support from the Connecticut Courant,  
Although our National Government must fall a sacrifice to the folly of 
Democracy, and to the fraud and violence of Jacobinism, yet if our state 
governments can be preserved, tranquility may yet be lengthened out. 
The observations are made in full view made in full view of the most 
deplorable event, the fall of the National Government. But, I hope our 
state governments may yet be preserved from the claws of Jacobinism.50  
 
As their flirtation with secession became more public, so to, did the criticism levied upon the Essex 
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Junto. Republicans saw what was happening in New England, and the Thomas Jefferson felt compelled 
to speak on the situation at this juncture as well, “The Essex Junto alone desire separation. The 
majority of the Federalists do not aim at separation. Monarchy and separation are the policy of the 
Essex Federalists.”51 Regardless of their intentions, here we see the first time that secessioniost doctrine 
shifts in its focus. Instead of being solely a states’ rights issue, the emergence of sectionalism 
perpetuated by the Essex Junto assisted in changing how secessionist techniques were applied.  
 The Junto edged closer to outright dissent once the extremists disposed of Hamilton as their 
leader, and Timothy Pickering effectively took on that role. Pickering was much more extremist than 
Hamilton and was not afraid to perpetuate the concept of secession. The former Secretary of State 
(even in the early 1800s, pre-Hartford Convention) was rather candid in his discussing regarding the 
American compact. While this early plan never fully came to fruition, the surviving correspondences 
are definitive examples of damning evidence that haunted Pickering’s future career. In a letter to 
George Cabot, Pickering did not mince his words,  
The last refuge of Federalism is New England, and immediate exertion, 
perhaps, its only hope. It must begin in Massachusetts. The proposition 
would be welcomed in Connecticut; and we doubt of New Hampshire? 
But New York must be associated; and how is her concurrence to be 
obtained? She must be made the center of the confederacy. Vermont and 
New Jersey would follow, of course, and Rhode Island of necessity.52  
 
The plot proposed by Pickering also placed the focus on British controlled Canada, an area that 
Americans believed would be easy to persuade. Note the vernacular used by Pickering here, the head of 
the Essex Junto literally mentions the concept of a separate confederacy years before the South had any 
similar plans. To ensure New York’s role in the proposed confederacy, the Junto enlisted the help of 
who other than Aaron Burr. According to some of his constituents, the former presidential runner-up 
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often spoke freely about dissention (even claiming that separation will not take place, but that it is 
necessary).53 In order to gain the favor of New York, the Junto decidedly pushed for Aaron Burr to 
become the next governor of New York.  
 To carry out their plan, the Junto still knew that they had to garner the favor of public opinion as 
well. Federalist newspapers continued to attack the Jefferson with ads questioning the constitutionality 
of some of the administration’s decisions. Most notably of course, being the Louisiana Purchase. To 
members of the Essex Junto, this was yet another consolidation of power made by the so-called 
“Virginia Dynasty”. The added territory did nothing to dissipate the growing fears in New England of a 
slave-state controlled union. Using this looming threat as justification, Burr met with Federalist leaders 
to discuss a possible alliance. 
 The Essex Junto believed Burr was the perfect choice to carry out their bidding because as his 
record showed, he was both a man of opportunity and ambition. Pickering and Cabot certainly had faith 
that once given their support, Burr would fall in line. Roger Griswold (member of the House of 
Representatives from Connecticut) was tasked with meeting the former presidential nominee and 
obtaining his commitment. Burr’s general disposition proved to be agreeable, and Griswold said this of 
the encounter,  
He (Burr) speaks in the most bitter terms of the Virginia faction, and of 
the necessity of a Union at the Northward to resist it; and it may be 
presumed that the support given to him by Federal men would tend to 
reconcile the feeling of those Democrats who are becoming dissatisfied 
with their Southern masters.54  
 
The Essex Junto now had their preferred candidate, but many Federalists condemned the plan as it 
would have promoted the dissolution of the United States. Yet again, Alexander Hamilton appeared to 
fan the flames and foil the extremist plans conjured up by the Junto. Hamilton (who was always at odds 
with Burr) levied his influence and wrote a pamphlet entitled Reasons Why it is Desirable that Mr. 
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Lansing, rather than Colonel Burr, Should Succeed.55 
  Hamilton’s work accused Burr of only using the Federalist Party to further his own 
goals, and that his true political leaning was Democratic. Not only were Burr’s political choices put 
into to question, but his morals as well. Hamilton believed that Burr was not going to hold true to the 
promises he had made to the Essex Junto. Interestingly enough and in congruence with the purpose of 
this thesis, at this point the Junto’s plans were relatively well-known. This fact makes the later omission 
of blame in regard to secessionist theory advanced by the North even more glaring.  Placing the blame 
solely on the South, as if interposition was a novel concept to mid-19th century Americans below the 
Mason-Dixon, is a disservice to historical study. Even Thomas Jefferson himself was privy to their 
scheme and had this to say, “The object of the Federalists is to divide the Republicans, join the majority 
and barter with them for the cloak of their name…the price is simple…The idea is clearly to form a 
basis of a separation of the Union.”56 In any event, Hamilton’s strong stance against Burr certainly hurt 
him, and the governorship of New York proved to be just outside of his opportunistic grasp. At this 
juncture the union was saved, however the plan to create a Northern confederacy was still in motion 
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Chapter 3: A Coming War and the Junto Plot of 1807 
  The Essex Junto’s first true flirtation with secession had ended unceremoniously and without 
conflict. However, over the next decade two more plans created by the Federalists associated with 
Essex County envisioned a Northern Confederacy. With the plans to make Burr the next president all 
but dead, the Essex Junto was left without a clear way to achieve their goals. The introduction of an 
embargo aimed to protect the United States’ neutral rights once again stoked the fires of disunion in 
New England. Their economy which relied heavily on foreign trade was to suffer, and Timothy 
Pickering and the Essex Junto were at the forefront of those attempting to combat the “oppressive” new 
mandates. 
 Thomas Jefferson differed from Federalist politicians on nearly every issue; Democratic-
Republicans promoted an agrarian economy, a working relationship with France, and furthered the case 
for states; rights.  These stances undoubtedly already displeased Federalists, but when war broke out 
between Britain and France in 1803, actions carried out by the administration further angered their 
political rivals.   
By 1807, both Britain and France deemed it illegal for neutral parties to trade with their 
respective enemies.  The United States was caught between two world superpowers and effectively had 
no say in the deliberations.  Jay’s Treaty never truly handled the issue of impressment 12 years earlier, 
and Great Britain began to seize American ships yet again.  The goal of Great Britain was to find 
British Navy deserters, but by this point, close to 10,000 Americans had been unjustly forced into 
British service against their will.  This whole series of events culminated on June22nd, 1807 during 
what historians have dubbed the Chesapeake Affair. 
 The USS Chesapeake was a Navy frigate that featured 38 guns and cost the young United States 
over $220,000 to construct in 1795.  After active service during the Barbary Wars, the USS Chesapeake 
was instructed to sail to the Mediterranean for patrol to relieve the now-legendary USS Constitution. 
Setting sail from Norfolk, Virginia on the morning of June 22nd, those aboard expected nothing more 
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than an ordinary voyage.  At 3:30 pm that day in Lynnhaven Bay, the Chesapeake was approached by 
the HMS Leopard, a fifty-two-gun British cruiser. In their dispatch, the British proclaimed that they 
wished to see the matter handled without any problems.57  The Americans rejected the Leopard’s call 
for a search, and Commodore Baron realized that the British were clearing the decks for battle.  Less 
than ten minutes later, the HMS Leopard opened fire.58 One well-placed shot destroyed the main mast 
on the Chesapeake, leaving the ship all but immobile.  For 20 minutes the Leopard attacked the 
American vessel, killing two and injuring 18.  Throughout the course of the exchange, the Americans 
were only able to muster one shot of return fire.59  With the fighting subsided, the British boarded the 
Chesapeake and began to search for deserters.  The search concluded after the British discovered four 
sailors that fit their categorization of deserter (three were now Americans who had formerly served in 
the British Navy, and one was an actual runaway named Jenkin Ratford who had been using a fake 
name).  After obtaining their prize, the Leopard sailed off and left the American frigate in shambles.  
That night around 8 p.m., the badly damaged Chesapeake set her course back for Virginia to relay the 
humiliation they had suffered at the hands of Great Britain. In New England, the Essex Junto watched 
with dismay as their beloved Great Britain, became the focus of American hostility.  
 In the weeks after the Chesapeake incident, the American public voiced their displeasure with 
the conduct displayed by the Royal Navy.  Republicans across the country shouted for war, headed by 
Kentuckian Henry Clay who earned themselves the nickname “war hawks” in the years leading up to 
the War of 1812.  Other Kentuckians shared his perspective and as Daniel Bradford wrote in the 
Kentucky Gazette, “Young men of America! Rally around the standard of your country, and prepare 
yourselves…to overwhelm with irresistible energy the violation of rights.”60  The West and the South 
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were both united at this time in their condemnation of Great Britain.  Surprisingly enough, even many 
Federalists realized that the actions of the Royal Navy were injurious to the character of the United 
States. To no surprise however, the Federalists that did advocate for war with Great Britain were in no 
way associated with the Junto. Timothy Pickering and his constituents still maintained a peaceful 
approach to relations with England.  Republicans and (only some) Federalists alike discarded their 
prior disagreements, as the country’s sentiment became increasingly anti-British.  As the Virginia Argus 
stated,  
The outrage committed by the British…roused all the patriotic feelings of 
the people, and seems to have buried in oblivion all party spirit.  
Federalists and Republicans are united in expressing their abhorrence of 
the conduct of the perfidious nation, and in the resolution of encountering 
them in War to revenge the unparalleled insults and injuries which they 
have inflicted on our country.61 
 
Cities and towns across the United States protested the despicable acts carried out by the British off the 
coast of Virginia.  In New York for example, Governor DeWitt Clinton organized thousands of 
protesters to line the streets of New York City.62  Southerners (especially in Virginia) were fearful that a 
full-scale British invasion was coming next.  Acting without presidential approval, Governor William 
H. Cabell of Virginia began assembling a militia to bolster the defenses of the “Old Dominion”.63  By 
July 6th, 1807 tensions had reached a fever pitch; citizens in Virginia believed that the British were 
going to attack Norfolk over the course of the next few days. 
Meanwhile in Massachusetts, Federalist politicians were plotting on how to use the coming 
situation to discredit the Republican administration and gain voters. The Essex Junto (namely George 
Cabot and Fisher Ames), urged for patience and cool tempers, classic Federalist values. Federalist 
leaders had taken note that even in their New England home states, Republicans were gaining 
significant support. This changing of the guard included the Republican Governor of Massachusetts, 
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James Sullivan. Timothy Pickering along with other Federalists in Massachusetts, urged that a sensible 
resolution should be achieved, deeming another war with England unnecessary.  As historian Gerald H. 
Clarfield states, “It might not be an ideal situation, but Pickering had concluded that living within the 
constraints established by a British blockade, was a more attractive option than war and the total 
destruction of America’s foreign trade.”64 Federalists continued to admonish the “Anglo-phobic” policy 
set in place by the Jefferson Administration, as many believed that the only defense against the tyrant 
Napoleon was Great Britain.  For the next few months, the majority of Americans believed that a 
declaration of war was coming. Armed conflict never came however, as the Jefferson administration 
decided to wage economic warfare instead. 
 On December 22nd, 1807 the United States passed an embargo on all foreign trade, which 
included both England and France. The embargo was in direct response to both England’s Order in 
Council and France’s Berlin Decree.   Jefferson believed that European powers would be forced to 
realize the importance of American trade, and would accordingly adjust their naval activities.  
Convincing the rest of Europe of the effectiveness of the embargo proved almost as difficult a task as 
convincing American citizens to abide by it, especially those in the Northeast. 
  The embargo inevitably backfired; this new policy proved disastrous on the American 
economy.  In 1808 (one year after the embargo passed), treasury statistics show that exports declined 
by almost 80%, while imports declined by 58.86% in the United States.  This drop-off translated to 
exports garnering just $22,431, down from $103,343.65 These are just the limited findings, as the 
Treasury did not track the economy to its fullest extent in the early 1800s.  Most notably omitted from 
this report is the meteoric rise of smuggling during this period.  By the time the disastrous effects of the 
embargo were realized, American merchants had already decided to disregard Jefferson’s wishes and 
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continued to smuggle goods out of the United States.  
 No single area in the United States was more at odds with the introduction of the Embargo of 
1807 than New England. Federalists rallied their constituents, calling the embargo unconstitutional and 
a threat to the union. The Northeastern United States (whose economies were based rather heavily on 
foreign trade) in most cases outright rejected the validity of said embargo. One key feature of 
Jefferson’s embargo was that it required American merchants and shipowners to comply with its 
provisions, otherwise it would not be effective and American neutral rights would be dismissed yet 
again by European powers.  An embargo set in place by a Democratic-Republican majority expectedly 
faced much opposition in Federalist New England.  By this point, the Federalist Party was already 
weakening on the national stage, and the enforcement of an embargo that clearly unevenly affected 
New England was seen as an inexcusable act carried out by the Jefferson administration.  The Essex 
and Timothy Pickering took this blunder (and the shift in public opinion) as the time to strike out 
against the administration and hopefully restore some power to the Federalist Party. This restoration of 
power to the Essex Junto, however, did not have to exist in the confines of the union.  Evidence of 
congressional opposition, party opposition, as well as state petitions for the repeal of the embargo and 
scattered reports of smuggling illustrate that the embargo was not only resisted, but even mocked.66   
 New England was the hotbed of resistance during the years leading up to the American 
Revolution and this tradition carried into this scenario as well; this time however, it was no longer the 
British Crown but the Federal Government that was the enemy. Just as they had prior, the Essex Junto 
once again spoke freely about the possibilities of disunion.  From the outset, the Massachusetts State 
Court never convicted any embargo violators, while the federal courts did.  This is again one of the 
most prominent issues that faced the early United States, a lack of synergy between federal and state 
governments.  The Republican majority in Congress did not listen to these early grievances however, 
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and the Jefferson Administration’s resolve only grew.  In a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury Albert 
Gallatin, Jefferson stated that unless European powers agreed to giving the United States neutral rights, 
the embargo would continue.67  The plan to more strictly enforce the embargo was simple; fines 
ranging from $1000 to $2000 and the seizure of merchant ships were threatened by the 
administration.68  In another later addition to the original embargo, the Jefferson Administration also 
mandated that Navy ships were authorized to search and seize any ship suspected of smuggling. Now 
not only were Federalists in the Northeast dealing with British impressment, but now effectively the 
same thing was being perpetrated by the Federal Government.  The “Enforcement Act” as it was 
dubbed, was met with the expected outrage in New England, with whispers of dissention becoming 
more and more prevalent.      
 Federalists were appalled at the effects of the embargo on their home states and called for its 
repeal.  On February 16th, 1808, Timothy Pickering authored an incendiary letter that charged the 
Jefferson Administration with being influenced by the French dictator Napoleon.  “Has the French 
Emperor declared that he will have no neutrals? Has he required that our ports, like those of his vassal 
states in Europe, be shut against British commerce? Is the Embargo a substitute, a milder form of 
compliance with that harsh demand?”69  Federalists believed that Jefferson’s recent communications 
with John Armstrong (the American Minister to France) proved that the administration was being 
influenced by the French government. To many Federalists this was unforgivable, and the same feeling 
from a few years earlier began to resurface in New England. The Essex Junto and Timothy Pickering 
had refueled their plot for secession at this juncture, and this time their plan was carried out in even 
more secrecy than before.   
 Timothy Pickering took the pen, and essentially accused Jefferson of withholding information 
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that clearly would have made France the true enemy, not Great Britain. Pickering devised the perfect 
strategy as to how to release the letter; instead of sending it directly to the administration, he sent it to 
Republican Governor James Sullivan.70  Sullivan reviewed the letter and refused to publish it, much to 
the delight of the Federalists. Their first plan had worked; now they could publish the contents of the 
letter themselves and charge that the Jefferson administration had attempted to suppress them. The 
question still arises however, where could such an outlandish claim have originally come from? John 
Quincy Adams (a Federalist who had many Republican tendencies) claimed in a letter to Thomas 
Jefferson, that he had been made aware of correspondence from the Governor of Nova Scotia in which 
he stated that many in Great Britain believed that France was pulling the strings.71  
 The Federalist Party in New England worked tirelessly to distribute the contents of Pickering’s 
letter across the United States in an attempt to highlight the downfalls of the Republican administration.  
Leaders in the Democratic-Republican Party took the accusation seriously; Attorney General Levi 
Lincoln even stated that, “So extensive sudden and rapid its spread that there was scarcely time or the 
means of a general counteraction.”72  Republicans in turn, charged Pickering’s letter with advocating 
secession.  Anti-Federalist papers across the country published articles attacking Pickering and the 
Federalist Party as a whole.  One article even stated that Pickering’s letter, “had been designed to touch 
the train which had been secretly laid to blow up our Republic.”73  Governor Sullivan was not as 
cryptic in his attacks on the Federalists.  Sullivan posed the question; why would Pickering appeal to 
the power of a state over the Federal Government, if not “to disunite, divide and dissolve the nation.”74   
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 To bolster their grievances against the Federalists, Republicans also charged Pickering with 
colluding with the British envoy George Rose.  Pickering and Rose had spent much time together while 
the latter was in the United States, and right when Pickering’s letter was released, Rose pulled out of 
negotiations over the USS Chesapeake.  Many across the country believed that Rose’s decision to halt 
negotiations had come after spending an evening in secret talks with Federalist leaders.  Based on the 
timing of the whole incident, there appears to be some truth behind these claims.  Whether it was true 
or not, there was enough evidence for Republicans to rally behind the accusations.  Republican 
Benjamin Crownfield stated that Pickering, “Would sell his country for fewer pieces of silver than 
Judas did his Master.”75   
 Fighting the embargo was never the main goal of the Essex Junto, but simply a part of a much 
larger strategy. Now that Pickering’s letter had sewed doubt in the administration, extremist Federalists 
had another chance to regain their former glory. By 1808, the Federalist party had lost much of its 
influence on the national stage. Just like with Burr years before, the Essex Junto knew that if they had 
any chance to win, Federalists had to nominate someone with more national appeal (not a Federalist). 
The plan once again involved New York, but this time it was George Clinton (who was running for 
vice-president as a Republican) who the Federalist threw their support behind. Clinton was surprisingly 
vocal in his displeasure regarding the embargo, making him the perfect candidate for the Essex Junto to 
rally behind. Federalism as a whole, we must remember, was not strictly a “Northern” party. After 
holding what was essentially the first nominating convention, Southern Federalists disagreed with their 
counterparts in the Essex Junto, and instead nominated Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South 
Carolina.  
 Jefferson’s embargo was never lifted during his time in office, and to no surprise James 
Madison was made President of the United states in 1808 after defeating Pinckney and a fractured 
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Federalist Party. The Federalists had achieved their goal however, as the embargo itself was facing 
fierce criticism not only from the general American public, but from certain Republicans as well.  In 
response, the Madison Administration passed the Nonintercourse Act.76  This officially ended the 
embargo, however, it was not an outright victory for the Federalists.  The Nonintercourse Act not only 
denied the British American exports, but also denied them access to the American market.  This could 
prove even more disastrous to England than the embargo, which seemingly had a more negative effect 
on the United States than its intended target.  
The fiery rhetoric advanced by pro-secessionists in the Northeast only increased in frequency. 
The Essex Junto originally hoped that their second attempt at disunion would be more secretive than 
their first attempt, but involving so many different figures and factions makes it rather difficult to cover 
your tracks. By the time of Madison’s inauguration, the 1807 attempt was basically spoken about 
freely. One Mr. James Russell for example, published multiple articles in the Columbian Centinel, a 
Boston-based newspaper. In his articles, Russell discusses the prospect of disunion and what role New 
England would have played in a newly constructed confederacy. Russell goes on to write,  
The Policy of Virginia demands nothing less than the sacrifice of greater 
interests of New England as the only condition on which she will adhere 
to the Union. She must and will govern us, with a policy that will forever 
cripple and destroy us, or separate from us and leave us to pursue our 
own systems, supported by our own resources. These I have attempted to 
estimate to assist the people of New England in forming their judgment 
of the consequences of such an event.77 
 
Again, there is a special emphasis placed on the “Virginia Dynasty”, but the true importance of this article 
is that now we see that even public newspapers in the Northeast felt emboldened enough to freely mention 
disunion. At this point secrecy was out the window, but another loose end (Clinton) confirmed officially, 
the Junto’s plan. The man whom Pickering and other Federalists had hoped would save their party, instead 
freely discussed the plan proposed to him by the Essex Junto. “It is perhaps known to few, that the project 
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of a dismemberment of this Union is not a novel plan, growing out of the recent measures of the 
Government, as has been pretended. It has been cherished by a number of individuals for a series of 
years.”78 Not only were private citizens publicly discussing disunion, but now elected officials as well. 
 James Madison (a decided disciple of Jefferson and the current Secretary of State), took note of 
the situation in New England and instead of urging compromise, worked with Congress to issue the Force 
Bill in January of 1809. The Force Bill cracked down on the embargo; officials were now to be stationed 
at major American ports to ensure the administration’s latest act was upheld. To no surprise, the Force 
Bill only added fuel to the fire in the Northeastern states. Civil War was on the horizon and to ensure that 
the Union was to be preserved, Congress repealed the embargo in March of 1809. In place of an embargo, 
the Non-intercourse law still banned trade with France and Britain, but opened up American ports to all 
other foreign trade.  
While the Federalists had technically accomplished their goal of repealing the embargo, these 
intrigues into disunion did not go unnoticed. Even after the repeal of the embargo, Great Britain still 
had faith that their friends in New England would leave the Union. Simultaneously as the embargo was 
being argued in the American political system, a plan was carried out by the Governor General of 
British Canada J. H. Craig. In what is now dubbed as the “Henry Mission”, J.H. Craig sent instructions 
to one John Henry to essentially tour the Northeastern United States and determine the public’s 
sentiment towards Great Britain. Craig’s instructions read as follows,  
The principal object which I commend to your attention, is the endeavor 
to obtain the most accurate information of the true state of affairs in that 
part of the Union, which, from its wealth, the number of inhabitants, and 
the known intelligence and ability of several of its leading men, must 
naturally possess a very considerable influence over, and will indeed, 
probably lead, the other Eastern States of America, in the part that they 
may take at this important crisis. The Federalists, as  I Understand, have, 
at all times, discovered a leaning to this disposition, and their being under 
its peculiar influence at this moment is the more to be expected, from 
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their having ill-founded ground for their hopes of being nearer the 
attainment of their object than they have been for some years past. It has 
been supposed that if the Federalists of the Eastern States should be 
successful in obtaining that decided influence which may enable them to 
direct the public opinion, it is not impossible that, rather than submit to a 
continuance of the difficulties and distress to which they are now subject, 
they will exert that influence to bring about a separation from the general 
Union.79  
 
The Governor General makes it known that Britain has taken notice of the Junto’s dealings, and his 
sending of Henry on this envoy was to ensure that the rumors coming from New England were indeed 
true. Henry was instructed to travel to Boston, in hopes of meeting some of the New England’s leaders. 
In all of his correspondence with Craig, Henry never divulges any of the names of the men he spoke 
with in Massachusetts. However, once can be sure that he dealt with leaders of the Essex Junto. While 
he was in the United States, Henry claimed that leaders in the Massachusetts were ready to form their 
own independent confederacy (essentially affirming that he was meeting with members of the Junto).  
 When the embargo was lifted, Craig’s interest in New England suddenly faded and Henry was 















Chapter 4: The War of 1812 and a Convention in Hartford, Connecticut 
 During the next three years the situation remained a stalemate, with the whispers of war on the 
tongues of almost every American.  The Federalists had achieved a modest revival, winning more seats 
after the failure of the Republican embargo. Most of their gains took place in the already staunchly 
Federalist Northeast, and their National influence was still waning. Their moves towards secessionist 
rhetoric had assisted in avoiding war with Great Britain, and their advocation of such techniques was 
excused, at least for the time being. 
 Two more events however, and the United States found itself at war yet again with its old rival 
Great Britain.  In a situation similar to the USS Chesapeake incident, the Little Belt affair of 1811 
proved to be final straw regarding American and British relations.80  Impressment was still continued 
by the British (even after the United States had made her feelings on the subject explicitly known) and 
in response to a recent case off the coast of North Carolina, President Madison sent the USS President 
to patrol the coast.  During its patrol, the American ship spotted the small HMS Little Belt and 
immediately gave chase.  When the two ships were within hailing distance, neither captain would 
answer what country they sailed for.  At this exact moment, a shot was fired from one of the ships 
(those present could not tell who shot first).  The USS President easily overwhelmed the Little Belt, 
killing 9 and injuring 23 British sailors.81  The American Captain John Rodgers repeatedly stated that 
the British sloop had fired the first shot and even offered the Little Belt port in any American harbor, 
which she denied.  American and British officials argued about the incident for an extended period, 
culminating in the British Navy awarding the captain of the Little Belt with a promotion. 
 The Little Belt incident saw with it, an increase in tensions between the two countries that could 
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seemingly only be resolved through war. War with Britain was the last thing that the Essex Junto 
wanted, and in New England Federalist leaders urged patience and reconciliation. As the United States 
deliberated on the events that occurred on the high seas, the Canadian John Henry’s role was not quite 
over yet. The gentleman was evidently owed some form of compensation for his services to the crown, 
compensation that Governor General Craig refused to pay. Once the embargo was lifted, British 
officials’ (including Craig) interest in the prospect of American disunion waned for the moment. John 
Henry took his case as far as the English Ministry, but to no avail.  
In a move that obviously shocked the Essex Junto, Henry proceeded to reveal his plan to the 
Americans (in hopes that someone would pay him for his time in New England). Madison received the 
correspondences written between Henry and Craig, and the President had this to say in regards to the 
Junto’s role in the plot, “These documents furnish proof to the plot for resisting laws, destroying the 
Union, and forming a political connection between the Eastern States and Great Britain.”82 With this 
information, why were the conspirators in New England not charged for their dissent? Although the 
papers were turned over to the American government, there were still no specific names used in the 
correspondence. Henry refused to divulge that specific information, but the consensus even back then 
was that Timothy Pickering and his group of radicals were secretly communicating with the British 
crown.  
   At this point, Madison was still on the fence whether to declare war or pursue a policy of 
mediation with the British.  Speaker of the House Henry Clay delivered a speech pushing for war that 
many of his contemporaries considered to be his finest oratory performance.  Unfortunately, there is no 
existing transcript of the speech, but its effect cannot be understated; on June 18th, 1812 the United 
States formally declared war on Great Britain.  The declaration of war passed narrowly, with the Senate 
voting 19 to 13 and the House voting 79 to 49.83  Henry Clay boasted that he could personally conquer 
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Canada with nothing more than the Kentucky militia. Even former President Thomas Jefferson said that 
the conquest of Canada would just be a matter of marching.  Those in New England however, had a 
much gloomier outlook, suspension of trade and financial ruin.  Even though the Federalist majority in 
New England pushed against the war, the Northeastern states actually raised the most militia regiments 
out of any section of the country.  This is of note, but as the war progressed so did anti-administration 
feeling.  Federalists in the Southern States (which included Chief Justice John Marshall) agreed with 
their Northern counterparts; that a war with Great Britain would prove disastrous to the Union.  
Marshall’s biographer claims that even outside of New England, Federalists were united in their 
opposition to the administration’s policies.84 
 The backlash against the war soon found itself on the floors of most of the lower houses in New 
England, with the Massachusetts General Court stating, “Organize a peace party throughout your 
Country, and let all other part distinctions vanish.”  The front against the war became more and more 
united, with New England shipping having ground to a halt in late June.  The unimaginable 
increasingly became a possible reality; if the war began to take a turn for the worse, would states in the 
Northeast consider secession?  The administration’s war slogan “Free Trade and Sailors” meant less to 
New Englanders who were actually turning out higher profits during neutral trade.85  Through July, 
Federalists adopted a policy of doing as little as they could to support the war.  This applied to 
everything from organizing militias to appropriating the necessary funds for defense. 
 The United States had begun to mobilize their plan to capture swiftly British-held Canada using 
three separate invasion forces.  Governor Strong had refused to supply a militia in spite of federal 
requests to do so, leaving the defense of New England in the hands of the Army regulars stationed on 
the coasts.  When the plan to invade Canada finally came to fruition however, these Army regulars 
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were called upon to assist in the expedition.  This left the coasts of New England virtually undefended 
for a short period of time (save for local militias).  Massachusetts refused replacement troops since 
New England militias elected their own officers and did not want to be placed under the command of 
federal troops.86  Republican newspapers claimed that a five-star, five-stripe flag was being flown in 
some New England towns like Newburyport, Massachusetts.   
 On the larger stage the war was not going according to plan, or at least the plan that war hawks 
had convinced the American people of; that this would be a short, easy war.  The three-pronged attack 
into Canada ran into serious problems at almost every juncture.  The first group was under the 
command of General William Hull and they were instructed to enter Canada by way of Detroit.  Hull 
had earned recognition during the American Revolution and was subsequently appointed the Governor 
of Detroit.  Prior to the War of 1812, he was seen as a capable if not cautious military leader.  
 Once the War of 1812 got underway however, this judgement of Hull swiftly changed.  Hull 
and a force of 2,000 intended to cross the border and lay siege to the Canadian fort, Fort Malden.  
Unfortunately for the Americans, before Hull realized that war had officially been declared he sent the 
small Cuyahoga Packet to Detroit with official papers and supplies.  British troops in the area captured 
the schooner and soon learned of the Americans’ plans.  To make matters worse, volunteers from Ohio 
under Hull’s command refused to cross into Canada as they felt it was outside of their duties as 
militiamen.  Nevertheless, Hull began his invasion of Canada on July 12th, 1812 and his force was 
quickly repelled, forcing a retreat back across the border to Fort Detroit.87  It was here that British 
commander Sir Isaac Brock (along with his Native American allies serving Tecumseh) tricked the 
American forces into thinking they were vastly outnumbered, which ultimately forced Hull to 
surrender.  Hull was later court-martialed and sentenced to death for his negligence and cowardice, 
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although President Madison intervened on account of his distinguished Revolutionary War record.88 
Federalists and the Essex Junto in New England were appalled at the disaster; and the news that 
came from the two other expeditions into Canada validated their concerns.  Both Stephen Van 
Rensselaer and Henry Dearborn’s New York militiamen under their command refused to cross into 
Canada.  The question was whether or not militias from a certain state were obligated to fight outside 
of their home states. Once again, illustrating the asynchrony between the federal and state 
governments.  Now, with lacking reinforcements and numerous setbacks coupled with inaction, the 
other phases of the Canadian invasion plan either failed or never started in the first place.   
 The financial strain and military failures proved to be too much for some New Englanders 
whose lives had been severely impacted by the war.  Republican papers like Baltimore’s Niles Weekly 
Register had predicted that with the war “political atmosphere will be purged, a greater degree of 
harmony will exist, and the regenerated spirit of freedom will teach us to love, to cherish, and support 
our unparalleled system of government, as with the mind of one man.”89  Federalists shared a much 
different opinion rooted in economic, religious and political reasons.  Pastors with Federalist ties 
preached to their parishioners that wars were a result of God’s displeasure.  Wars (according to them), 
were responsible for taking once Christian men and making them immoral.  Men who once worked 
virtuous daily jobs were now forced to pick up arms, and most indulged in all of the “vices” available 
to them at army camps.90  
 Life in an army camp according to Federalists could lead to life full of debauchery and lacking 
prayer.  Pastors warned that a lust for war had destroyed nations before, and that the United States had 
to adhere to God’s teachings to avoid such destruction.  Not only were the soldiers negatively affected, 
but returning home with these new ungodly habits would wreak havoc across New England.  An 
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expected rise of profanity, theft and drunkenness is what Federalists envisioned once the war was 
underway.  According to historian Lawrence Cress, “Reports from the Ohio River Valley during the 
first year of hostilities indicating that the army’s presence had brought vice to villages heretofore 
unspoiled and blasphemous speech to public inns once safe for the most pious soul confirmed the 
Federalists’ worst fears.91  Not only was this war a Republican construct, but their disregard for both 
morality and Christianity was thought to have had the potential to hurl the young United States into the 
throws of Revolution like her French counterpart. 
According to Federalists, the war would see with it a large spike of immorality across the 
United States.  Immorality included civil disobedience, as smugglers across New England still traded 
with Great Britain which obviously directly disobeyed the federal government.  A general decline in 
public virtue was expected to occur while wars were being fought.  Some American sailors found new 
opportunities and enlisted as privateers.  Privateers sanctioned by the federal government were 
instructed to harass British ships and hopefully prove to be a detriment to Great Britain’s financial 
stability.  Privateers, however, were always considered to be nothing more than pirates.  Federalists 
condemned piracy; clergymen in New England would be shocked to see the widespread romanticism of 
pirates today.  The problem, however, was that privateering was not enough to offset the losses that 
came from halted trade.   
Federalists also cited the threat of anarchy as one of the main reasons why the war should be 
ended (or rather, why it should have never started in the first place).  Even before the war, Federalists 
were appalled by the horrors of the French Revolution.  The French had, according to them, plunged 
themselves deep into the recesses of anarchy. At the time however, many Republicans believed that the 
French had followed their American example of revolution.  Even after witnessing the horrors of the 
French Revolution, Republican leaders like Thomas Jefferson believed, 
Was ever such a prize won with so little innocent blood? My own 
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affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this 
cause, but rather than it should have failed. I would have seen half the 
Earth desolated. Were there but an Adam and Eve left in every country, 
left free, it would be better than it now is.92  
 
 In retirement, Thomas Jefferson did not change his tune, “This ball of liberty, I believe most piously, is 
now so well in motion that it will roll round the globe, at least the enlightened part of it, for light and 
liberty go together.  It is our glory that we first put it into motion.”93   
 This Francophile outlook on what was happening in France was vehemently condemned by 
Federalists throughout the United States (not just the Northeast).  Federalism as an ideology had always 
recommended that its constituents remain in the station they currently were, meaning that if the 
authority is just, you should adhere to it.  This partly explains why this particular political party 
supported Great Britain, a country who promoted monarchial rule.  Respecting those in power and 
remaining “happy” in one’s current situation were both two of the main aspects of Federalism.  One 
should not strive for more; let those who you entrusted to be part of the elite speak and work on your 
behalf.  The fact that Federalists had this viewpoint is somewhat ironic (as they were the product of a 
revolution themselves), but nonetheless this ideology exacerbated the fear of what was happening in 
France. 
 Regardless, Federalists decided collectively that the fledgling United States was still too young 
to engage in warfare.  This is especially true, when the chosen opponent happened to be the most 
powerful military in the world at the time.  An untrusted and untried union was one that could have 
very likely failed.  Federalist clergymen across the country invoked images of a destroyed country in 
hopes to dissuade their followers from supporting the war.  Even since their inception, Americans have 
seemingly always been of the mindset that any war they enter, they will win.  As one clergyman told 
his followers, “We have imagined ourselves secure from the dangers and disasters of other nations; and 
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have refused to take warning from the fallen republics of ancient and modern times.”94   
Others believed that not only were Americans ignorant, but their unrighteousness over the last 
twenty years had earned God’s wrath.  A lack of religious piety (according to many Federalists) must be 
why the country found itself embroiled in yet another war so early into its creation. To many 
Federalists, a country that actively seeks war is one that has turned its back on God, and any such 
nation who had turned its back on God is one that undoubtedly would face ruin. The Madison 
administration had been directly influenced by War Hawks in the House, and (according to Federalists) 
until the administration could properly identify the transgressions committed by Britain the United 
States should not entertain war.  Those who stood idly by as their country took part in an unjust war 
were deemed just as guilty as those who pushed for war themselves. As David Osgood (a Federalist 
clergyman) stated during one of his speeches,   
Each man who volunteers his services in such a cause, or loans his 
money for its support, or by his conversation, his writings, or any other 
mode of influence, encourages its prosecution…loads his conscience 
with the blackest of crimes, brings the guilt of blood upon his soul, and in 
the sight of God and his law, is a murderer.95 
 
Federalist leader John Lowell doubled down on this sentiment, stating that common law did not even 
excuse a slave from the crime of murder.  How then, could Americans commit such “atrocities” as it 
would place them right in league with those they kept in bondage? 
  Interestingly enough, a pursuit of worldly goods is one example of what Federalists deemed as 
“ungodly”.96  For a political party that focused very heavily on merchant activities and trade, this idea 
does not seem congruent with the rest of their beliefs.  Either way, it was used as justification yet again, 
for Federalists to consider taking action against the federal government.    
As mentioned above, the effects of the war were not limited to religious immorality, as the 
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economy in New England plummeted shortly after the declaration of war.  Firstly, the call to militia 
was not only dangerous, but with a lack of able hands the economy was bound to suffer.  Fewer farmers 
meant fewer crops, and less workers meant less manufacturing.  One pastor in New England evoked 
images of financial ruin when he spoke to his congregation, “Many who are now in affluent 
circumstances will be reduced to poverty.”97  With many of New England’s young men being shipped 
to different areas of North America, who was to defend the coastlines of the Northeast?  Coupling this 
thought with the fact that Britain had the most powerful navy in the world seriously worried many 
Federalist leaders. 
   Some Federalist planters however, faced a separate problem.  Federalist ranks did reach the 
Deep South, and slaveholders there were desperately trying to control their slaves.  If word of the 
Americans’ lackluster battle record reached the ears of blacks in the South, the promise of British 
emancipation could have proven irresistible.  Slaveholding Federalists imagined widespread revolts.  
The Haitian Revolution had recently shocked the Western world, and Southerners continually cited the 
situation there when discussing their fears of uprisings.  In reference to his slaves one Federalist in the 
South noted that they were, “restless in their bondage, and easily excited to arms.”98   
 In perhaps a more realistic view of the situation, some Federalists condemned the war due 
solely to the fact the United States was not ready for war.  Ill-prepared would be an understatement; the 
young country only had a standing army of about 7,000 at the start of the war.99 By contrast, Great 
Britain had been engaged in the Napoleonic Wars for years and had bolstered their standing army to 
around 250,000 regulars. Americans who supported the war had hoped that Britain was too involved in 
their European ventures to dedicate the majority of their troops to North America. Regardless, the 
disparity between the two militaries was certainly indicative of the lack of preparations taken by the 
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United States.  The Connecticut General Assembly for example states that the United States was, 
“without fleets, without armies, with an impoverished treasury and with a frontier by sea and land 
extending many hundred miles, feebly defended.”100  The United States’ Navy at the beginning of the 
war, only had 16 ships ready for battle.  The British on the other hand, had closer to 120 ships of line as 
well as 600 frigates.  This disparity invoked fears that the British would easily be able to blockade the 
Eastern Seaboard, as well as take control of the Great Lakes.   
 All of these factors compounded in a political divisiveness that had the potential to fracture the 
nation.  George Washington had warned against political parties, and many believed that partisanship 
was what would finally tear the country apart.  In response to all the charges brought up by Federalists, 
Republican newspapers charged the party with being anti-democratic and supporters of monarchy.  
Preluded by similar issues during the Adams’ administration, the Republican Press did their best to 
discount Federalist claims of ruin, effectively silencing them in Republican-controlled areas.101 
  As discussed earlier in this paper in chapter two, the Adams Administration’s decision to 
suspend habeas corpus is one of the main reasons why the current president James Madison had written 
his Virginia Resolution in the first place.  Federalists were obviously aware of both the Resolutions, 
and used them as the political ideology to back their flirtation with secession.  
As the Republican newspapers continued to levy their charges against Federalists as a whole, a 
feeling of dissent grew among their ranks.  Even while all this was happening, Federalists still adhered 
to their political ideology of respectful adherence to the federal government (save for the Essex Junto).  
Leaders across New England and the South instructed their constituents to follow a policy of cool and 
reasonable dissent. If there was one thing that Federalists feared more than a war with Great Britain, it 
was widespread anarchy.  Noted Federalist William Ellery Channing agreed with this sentiment stating, 
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“Resistance of established power is so great an evil, civil commotion excites such destructive passions, 
the result is so tremendously uncertain, that every milder method of relief should first be tried, and 
fairly tried.”102 Opposition to the war was tolerated only if it fell within the confines of the 
Constitution; if a government proved unjust one must change it using acceptable Republican concepts.  
Federalists around the country adhered to this call, and held public meetings widespread to 
discuss their grievances with the Madison Administration.  Antiwar representatives were elected to 
head the Federalist Party and this in turn, angered their political opposition. Noted antiwar Federalist 
Rufus King of Massachusetts for example, “Regarded the war, as a war of party and not of country.”103 
This is the sentiment that Federalist’s like John Lowell and Nathan Dane also subscribed to, that the 
war was purely a Republican scheme that was going to prove ruinous to the United States. Lowell for 
example stated that, “Making peace with our enemy and opening once more our commerce with world, 
would be a wise and manly course.”  Many Republicans who became aware of these meetings charged 
their attendees with treason.104   Federalist leaders however, still maintained that everything they were 
doing was within the acceptable confines of the Constitution. 
Changing the outlook of the nation and restoring peace had to come through the use of 
elections; Federalists believed they had every right to pursue this style of dissent. Even the legendary 
orator Daniel Webster weighed in on the issue when he stated, “By the exercise of our constitutional 
right of suffrage, by the peaceable remedy of election, we shall seek to restore wisdom to our Councils, 
and peace to our Country.”105 The warning that Federalists gave to their followers was that even in 
times of dissent, partisan feelings must be expelled.  Nonetheless, the charges against them raised by 
Republicans continued to grow more numerous by the day.  This constant levying of accusations wore 
thin; by the later stages of the war some Federalists began to wonder what the benefits of remaining in 
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the Union truly were.      
The New England states began to question what their place was in a compact of states that 
seemingly disregarded their needs. Many Federalists resigned themselves to the fact that the Union 
could crumble, and that New England would be forced to leave. Some Federalists, namely Pickering, 
actually anticipated a departure; New England would be able to take more efficient care of itself 
because the Northeastern states (in many cases) shared the same economic and political beliefs. 
Federalists believed that they were destined to carry on the “republican experiment”, and many 
welcomed a dissolution of the United States with open arms.106  Here we see the shouts for dissolution 
reach a fever pitch for the first time, before its eventual climax in the 1860s.  New England was to be 
the new birth of democracy, away from the American West which Federalists despised so much.  
Federalists had an apathetic viewpoint in regard to the West; many had disagreed with Thomas 
Jefferson’s decision to approve the Louisiana Purchase.  Obviously, this was another example of 
Federalist versus Republican politics, but New England’s dislike of the West was deeper than that. At 
this time, many Federalists developed an inherent distrust of those living in the new territories. Many 
believed that it was a land of lawlessness, one that simply could not coincide with a democratic nation.  
Samuel Taggart (a Presbyterian minister and representative from Massachusetts), had this to say about 
the west during one of his orations to his congregation,  
In a territory so extensive as the United States, comprising within its 
limits, perhaps, nearly all the varieties of the human species, to be found 
in the civilized world, peoples whose sentiments, habits, manners, and 
prejudices, are very different, and whose local interests and attachments 
various, it is not strange that the seed of division should exist.107 
 
This particular speech captured the Federalists’ sentiment at the time.  How could a nation that was not 
only so different geographically, but also culturally, hope to remain intact? Caleb Strong (another 
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prominent Federalist) also foresaw the coming of disunion believing that, “the territory of the U.S. is so 
extensive as to forbid us to indulge the expectation that we shall remain many years united.”108  
 John Lowell Jr. (a notable Federalist and lawyer) urged that the original union remain intact, 
arguing that a country that included the West was far too large.  Democratic government and the 
republican experiment worked perfectly in the original 13 colonies, so why expand the United States 
any larger than that? Federalists acknowledged that the Louisiana Purchase was illegal, but also that it 
endangered the original compact between the 13 states. Many Federalists believed that it was 
impossible for one country to rule a territory so vast, and that the mountains that bordered the Eastern 
states acted as a barrier created by God to protect their republic.109 Lowell believed that both the West 
and East would benefit from a split. The South he thought, should rejoin the North in exchange for 
New England allowing the Three-Fifths Compromise to remain in effect.  
Timothy Pickering and his Essex Junto constituents agreed with the sentiment of a North-South 
"re-approachment" plan and surmised that raising taxes on the west to unfair levels would convince 
them to leave the Union. “Entertaining this opinion, I cannot think of course, that a separation at this 
time would be an evil; on the contrary, I believe an immediate separation would be a real blessing to 
the good old thirteen states, as Jon Randolph once called them.”110  Many New Englanders began to see 
disunion as conditional and Federalist newspapers began to share the same feeling, “It is an event we 
do not desire, not because we have derived advantages from the compact, but because we can foresee 
or limit the dangers or effects of revolution.”111 Here we see the first time that those outside of the elite 
Essex Junto group openly pronounced that disunion was acceptable according to American law. 
Essentially, this paved the way for mid-19th century Southerners to share the same sentiment decades 
later. This thought became commonplace throughout the Federalist ranks. In 1813 for example, a 
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Newburyport editor wrote, “We have always been led to believe that a separation of the States would 
be a great evil. We still think it an evil. But rather than prosecute the present war, which will eventuate 
in the ruin of the Northern and Eastern States…we think it by far the least of the two evils.”112  
Ironically, Jefferson and Madison’s Resolutions became integrated into Federalist political theory as a 
justification for their secessionist ideas. Since the states came together and formed a confederation, it 
was in the states’ hands to determine what their individual obligations to it were. With multiple states 
conjointly working together, Federalists looked to the concept of interposition to achieve their goals. A 
unified voice against the administration soon found itself quarrelling amongst itself, due to 
disagreements over what strategy they should take.  
Politicians in New England continued to urge a policy of simply rejecting the war, on the 
grounds that the Northeast had no stake in the conflict.  Elijah Parker (a preacher from Massachusetts) 
gave a fiery speech to his parishioners in which he told his followers to,  
…proclaim an honourable neutrality; let the southern heroes fight their 
own battles, and guard against the vengeance of their lacerated slaves. 
Break those chains, under which you have sullenly murmured, during the 
long, long reign of democracy; and once more breathe that free, 
commercial air of New England which your fathers always 
enjoyed…Protest did I say, protest? Forbid this war to proceed in New-
England.113 
 
Governor Caleb Strong shared this sentiment and encouraged the public to decry against the war 
throughout Massachusetts. With high-ranking Federalists (in league with the Essex Junto) stoking the 
fires of political outrage, New Englanders began to follow suit. 
 Inflammatory language became a staple of Federalist doctrine; newspapers preached that 
Federalists had to resist the Federal Government. The Essex County Centennial for example, had this 
to say on the matter, “Our common interests, liberties, and safety, are now more injured, oppressed and 
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endangered, by the doings of our own National Government, than they were when in 1775 we took 
arms to protect and defend them against the measures of the government of Great-Britain.”114 Invoking 
the language of the American Revolution and applying it to the current state of affairs in the United 
States was certainly a powerful comparison. Distinguished Federalists Thomas Dawes and Noah 
Webster frequently wrote each other, and together they brainstormed a way for Federalists to finally be 
heard.  
Taking direction from what had occurred in 1808, the idea of a unified convention resurfaced. 
“There is but one way left to save us from the yoke of Bonaparte and Virginia,” Thomas Dawes wrote 
to Noah Webster, “…the rising of the New England people. I mean nothing illegal or unconstitutional; I 
do not mean a Whiskey rebellion or anything like that. You know what I mean. And tho’ late, I think 
with you, it is not too late.”115 The plan was not to come to fruition just yet however, as the promise of 
another chance at a successful presidential candidate proved more attractive than interposition. 
Federalists knew that their chances of holding a convention at this moment were rather small; the 
Massachusetts senate was controlled by the Republicans.  
The election in October was seemingly their only chance to have their voices heard, and in an 
effort to defeat Madison the Federalists nominated DeWitt Clinton. The former New York governor 
accepted the nomination and after a brief convention in New York, Clinton was the Federalist 
candidate. Federalists voted in greater number than they had before; Federalist leaders had continually 
preached how interposition was the proper political discourse.  With a united front, Federalists came 
undeniably close to victory. Clinton however, lost by a mere 19 electoral votes to Madison.  Once 
again, the Federalists and the Essex Junto had been defeated, a blow that seemingly came at the worst 
possible time. Perhaps further discussions on disunion could have been avoided had Federalists won 
the election, but without a legislative channel to obtain their goals, the Essex Junto’s influence became 
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stronger than ever. 
Madison’s introduction of another restrictive trade tariff yet again fanned the flames of 
Federalist dissent. Legislative measures were evidently of no use, and Federalists around the country 
were fearful that their voices had no chance of being heard. Some Federalists in Middlesex County 
argued that, “Instead of wishing to withdraw from the Union, we fear that the government has 
withdrawn from us.”116 In December of Madison’s first year as president, Hampshire County 
Federalists brought forth to the General Assembly that a convention was perhaps necessary in this 
instance. Noah Webster proposed a plan for a multiple-state convention at the General Assembly, and 
drafted a letter issuing the grievances that plagued Federalists around the country. 
 Still displeased by the role that slaves played in representation, assertions that the Three-Fifths 
Compromise was unjust was one of the main problems facing Federalists.  Webster claimed that when 
the Northern states agreed to the compromise, it inherently meant their maritime industry be protected 
as well.117 The Northern states hoped for an actual amendment to the Constitution that could be used to 
protect their influence across the nation. The push for a convention between the commercial states of 
the North and South gained more and more traction, as Hampshire County took their grievances to the 
larger courts.  
Leaders in Boston such as Harrison Gray Otis maintained that the convention arose in rural 
parts of New England, perhaps in an attempt to distance themselves from the somewhat secessionist 
ideology ramping up through the countryside. “We at Boston played only second fiddle to our country 
friends…My impression is that the Country of Hampshire was always foremost in these matters, and 
that if I had been hanged as a ringleader, you and your friends would have been bound in honor to 
maintain my family.”118 Whether this admission was later used to simply deflect his place in the 
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convention, or whether the Boston elites truly had no hand in the early push for a convention, is 
relegated to conjecture. However, in retrospect the rise of anti-unionist feeling was certainly propelled 
not by those in Hampshire County, but those connected to Essex County. 
Towns across New England continued to follow suit in support of a convention, with cries of 
being enslaved by a despotic regime. A regime, that even after Federalists made their grievances 
known, still chose to ignore them. Radicalism began to spread like wildfire, and Federalist leaders were 
tasked with remaining moderate in an attempt to inhibit any unjustified behavior. Harrison Gray Otis 
and fellow moderates were successful in delaying the convention yet again at this time, but the 
Senator’s comments on secession are noteworthy.  Otis defended the right of secession, but claimed 
that, “we were not yet ready to proceed to those extremities.”119 
This admission was crucial, as Otis was one of the first high-ranking Federalists to openly speak 
about the prospect of disunion. A consensus was reached among Federalists; now was the time to start 
to plan a multi-state convention.  This first report considered the embargo void, therefore it did not 
require to be nullified. To make the sweeping changes to the Constitution that Federalists longed for, 
they first decided to seek public approval from their supporters. Upcoming elections were the perfect 
way for Federalist leaders to test public sentiment in regard to a convention. Caleb Strong (the tried and 
true Federalist candidate) was once again nominated for the role of Massachusetts Governor. 
Republicans nominated Samuel Dexter, who in truth was actually a Federalist. Republicans chose 
Dexter simply because he took a moderate approach most issues, and he strongly opposed the proposed 
of a convention. 
 Strong carried 55 percent of the vote and the Federalists gained control of the lower house by a 
margin of 204. With Federalist control of the legislatures, averting a convention now seemed 
improbable. The year of 1814 saw the war expand across United States, and American opposition to the 
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war steadily grew. The invasion of Maine’s coastal shores and the burning of Washington in August, 
agitated Federalists to the point of discussions that involved a separate peace commission.120 In the 
midst of all of these American military blunders, Governor Strong still refused to send militias to 
Maine, as he believed that it was the responsibility of the national government. Disconnect between 
state governments and the Federal Government, yet again led to issues. Rumblings of more radical 
Federalists taking matters into their own hands, finally forced the leaders of the party to carry out what 
they had been so reluctant to do. In September, Governor Strong called for a meeting of the General 
Court to call for a convention of Northeastern states.121 
 With the public growing increasingly hostile towards the administration, Federalist officials 
knew that many of their Essex Junto constituents’ more radical ideas had to be considered. Harrison 
Gray Otis conceded to this point when he wrote that the public was, “high toned and menacing.”122 To 
satisfy their demands, the adoption of nullification strategies was needed. In an attempt to avoid even 
more extreme measures (most of which proposed by the general public), was to officially hold a 
convention with party leaders. Many Federalist leaders were moderates, so was the agreement to hold a 
convention an actual move towards nullification, or was it strictly to quell public outcry? This point is 
often contended by historians and is used to downplay the Hartford Convention’s effect on later 
Southerners. In any event, even moving towards convention opened the door for future secessionist and 
nullification strategies. Southerners like John C. Calhoun can point to the calling of a convention of 
Northeastern states as an inspiration for secession, in the same way Federalists cited Jefferson and 
Madison’s Resolutions as their inspiration.   
 Harrison Gray Otis was now one of the leading voices that pushed for a convention. A man of 
incredible wealth even by today’s standards, Otis embodied the Federalist elite-ism so prevalent in the 
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early 19th century. Serving as both the Attorney General and President of the Senate of Massachusetts, 
Otis was a well-connected and highly respected member of the Boston community (leading to his 
eventual mayorship from 1829 to 1832). His stance was still moderate however, even against the 
wishes of more radical party members like Francis Blake. A report (known as “Otis Report”) was 
written by the special committee and among its contents voiced concern over the need for 
constitutional amendments to protect the interests of New England. The committee formally 
acknowledged the need for a multiple state convention and pushed for one to be held. The report also 
focused on amending the unjust (according to New Englanders) practice of counting slaves towards a 
state’s representation, as well as a limit to the president’s ability to institute embargos.  
 The house voted to approve the Otis Report by a vote of 260 to 90, and the Senate approved the 
report by a vote of 22 to 12.123 The vote confirmed that letters of invitation be sent to all of the other 
Northeastern states, and the search for 12 delegates began. Unsurprisingly, Republican politicians 
absented themselves, allowing the Federalists to handpick their delegates. Yet again, a moderate stance 
prevailed. Federalist Party leaders chose men who held a more thoughtful temperament, men like 
George Cabot, Joseph Lyman and Nathan Dane. This moderate grouping of party leaders was actually 
well received by Federalists of any sect, including the more radical ones. Even Timothy Pickering 
approved of the delegates that were chosen and assured that they had, “more wisdom, virtue and real 
patriotism than it would be easy to bring together elsewhere in the United States.”124  
While the men were noted as being virtuous, their timid and moderate leanings were called into 
question by many. Regardless, Connecticut and Rhode Island each respectively voted to answer the call 
to convention. New Hampshire declined the invitation, and many leading Federalists there (including 
Daniel Webster) were not in favor of such a bold strategy. Later in life when pressed on the issue of 
whether or not Webster was in attendance he wrote,  
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I have read your letter and cheerfully answer its inquiry. I was not a 
member of the Hartford Convention and had no agency in it, nor any 
correspondence with any of its members. If you will refer to the Journal 
of Congress, and to the dates of the proceedings relative to that 
Convention, you will find, My Dear Sir, that I was in my seat in the 
House of Representatives in Congress, which was before any proposition 
to hold such a Convention was brought forward, and that I remained in 
the seat, until after the Convention had met and dissolved.125 
 
A couple decades later, those who had any connection to the Hartford Convention were accused of 
secessionist plots and many of the politicians associated with it (Timothy Pickering, Harrison Gray 
Otis, and Caleb Strong for example), never recovered.  
 With the delegates chosen, the last task was to make sure that the goal of the Convention would 
truly address the problems brought to light by New England’s citizens. While many citizens called for 
extreme action, as noted, the Federalist leaders carried forth with an abundance of caution. Some 
Federalist controlled states were reluctant to partake in the convention; New Hampshire and Vermont 
chose their delegates independently from the state legislature. Caution was abundant in the weeks 
leading up to the convention, and Federalist radicals like Timothy Pickering chose not to attend and did 
not offer any stand-ins. In a later to Pickering, John Lowell confessed that he did not have much faith 
in the convention and that men like Otis were, “naturally timid and frequently wavering.”126 
This lack of fiery discourse only exacerbated the extremist views of Essex Junto who were 
displeased with how the Convention was shaping up. John Lowell, Jr. and Gouverneur Morris 
(Founding Father and author of the Preamble) both pushed for an autonomous New England if their 
grievances were not addressed. Southern Federalists were in support of many of the referendums that 
Northern Federalists advocated, and they were led by the boisterous and eccentric John Randolph of 
Roanoke. A former Democratic-Republican, Randolph’s ideology began conflicting with Thomas 
Jefferson’s in the early 1800s causing a fracture in the party. While he was no supporter of Jefferson or 
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Madison (who was seen as an extension of Jefferson), Randolph still warned against “rash counsels” 
claiming that they were almost always unwise.127 Randolph’s sentiment was shared by many statesmen 
at the time, including “reformed” Federalist and future President John Quincy Adams. Adams believed 
that the Hartford Convention solely existed to fan the fires of secession, and that it was being used as a 
tool to support radical Federalist ideologies. A conflict of temperaments and outlooks in regard to the 
Convention is why the actual purpose of it is still contested today.  
Harrison Gray Otis was at the forefront of the conception of a Convention, and he continually 
explained that the purpose of it was simply to extinguish the flames of secession. This was the stance 
taken by many leading Federalists, that the Convention was, “intended, by those who voted for it, as a 
safety valve by which the steam arising from the fermentation of the time might escape, not as a boiler 
in which it should be generated.”128 This sentiment was shared by fellow Federalist Nathan Dane, 
another moderate who was worried that the Convention could lead to a fracture. At the conclusion of 
the Convention, Dane wrote,  
The fact was, moderate men saw the excitement was going too far and it 
was leading to evils far greater than the war itself…This convention, as 
intended, moderated and checked an inflamed, growing opposition to the 
administration of federal affairs which might, in the then violence of 
party spirit, have in time embarrassed and shaken the Union.129 
 
Moderates wholly disregarded more serious moves towards secession throughout the 
deliberations, and focused more heavily on the defenses of New England. That is not to say however, 
that other attendees were not yet radicalized. Lawyer and known extremist Timothy Bigelow was 
present and while his concerns were heard, he was one of the only men at the Convention who could 
have been considered “radical”. As historian Donald Hickey states, “The convention, dominated by 
moderates, had perhaps as many as three radicals. The only known radical, Bigelow, was given no 
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committee assignments and apparently did not play a major role in the proceedings. Nor was there any 
sign of disunion.”130  
Those with cool heads made sure that the proceedings would not get out of hand; Otis 
vehemently opposed adding any amendments to the Constitution in the final Convention report. Only 
after internal rumblings were amendments (which focused on wartime power, the creation of 
embargoes and the admission of new states), added to the official report. These proposed amendments 
proved to be enough to placate those who were interested in secession as an option. The final pamphlet 
that included the proposed amendments was approved unanimously by those in attendance.  The “cool 
heads” of New England Federalism prevailed again; citizens were always instructed to only oppose the 
government if all other options have been extinguished. That line of thinking is exactly what moderate 
Federalists preached to their constituents during the deliberations of the Convention. The Convention 
invoked the same political discourse contained in Jefferson and Madison’s writings, but Federalists 
were still rather reluctant to make these ideologies mainstream. Instead of looking for ways to actively 
separate, the largest part of the Convention report focused on how national harmony could be restored.  
Federalists blamed the nation’s “ruin” on a variety of factors including the introduction of new 
states, unqualified public officials, naturalized foreigners, anti-British sentiment and Virginia’s grip on 
the presidency. Seven amendments were formally accepted at the Convention, all of which dealt with 
the aforementioned “transgressions”. Voting based solely off of the white population, a 2/3 voting 
requirement for the admission of new states, a 60 day limit to all embargos, a 2/3 vote to approve an 
embargo, a 2/3 vote to go to war where the United States was the aggressor, a mandate that naturalized 
citizens could not hold public office, and a mandate stating that the president could not succeed himself 
as well as outlawing the election of a president from the same state consecutively were all included in 
the report.131 
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New Englanders never explicitly pushed for secession during their deliberations, but the 
ideological concept of threatening secession for political gain was certainly used. While there is still 
contention as to what was truly discussed during the Hartford Convention (as there is no written 
record), the mere utilization of these tactics paved the way for future Americans to include nullification 
and secession in their political discourses. Whether the rumors of secession were only the ideals of a 
handful of extremists, or if the majority of Federalists agreed with stronger measures, is not as 
important as simply presenting the concept of secession in the political sphere. Just how Federalists 
cited the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions as examples of how the threat of separation could be used 
a tool, their deliberations at Hartford were the next step in the ideological argument. 
 The question now arises, why did high-ranking Federalists never use their political trump card? 
The answer is rather simple; the fear of disrupting their future political careers and economic standing. 
The possibilities that came with disunion were a New England civil war, economic struggles or even a 
Federalist versus Democratic-Republican civil war. While these outcomes seem outlandish now, during 
the early years of the Constitution the prospect of danger and ruin were much higher. However, the 
main reason as to why the Hartford Convention fell short of its more radical proposals was that by 
January of 1815 the war with Great Britain was all but over. Public opinion had changed from 
discouraged, to a revitalized patriotism as Americans felt they had won the war. Andrew Jackson’s 
victory over Sir Edward Pakenham in New Orleans was the main reason for this shift in sentiment (and 
this renewed patriotism propelled Jackson to the presidency just over a decade later). 
By the time Federalists had appointed an envoy to make New England’s grievances known in 
Congress, the Federal Government already voted to federalize state forces. The envoy which was 
headed by Otis received no instruction in regard to the amendments proposed during the Convention. 
Perhaps party leaders realized the national mood and chose not to include the amendments to avoid 
being associated with a “secessionist plot”. By the time Otis reached Washington, his prospects of 
success were rapidly diminishing. The administration heard their arguments, but nothing came of them 
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and the New Englanders returned home. In the end, the Hartford Convention proved to be pointless, but 
its promotion of interposition on the national stage was certainly notable. The leaders of the Essex 
























Chapter 5: The Antebellum South, John C. Calhoun and the Doctrine of Nullification 
The political ideology presented at the Hartford Convention and the decision its members made 
to explore the doctrine of nullification invented by Jefferson, opened the door for later Americans to 
justify their secessionist tendencies. Federalists cited Jefferson and Madison as the true conceivers of 
nullification, showcasing how the ideology itself transcended both party lines and personal grudges. By 
the mid-1800s, mounting pressure had forced Southerners to believe that their way of life was being 
threatened, especially when it came to the “peculiar institution”. The voice that continually defended 
Southern interest was the highly educated and vehemently sectionalist John C. Calhoun of South 
Carolina. Calhoun has long been condemned as the main advocate of Southern secessionism, yet during 
his early political career was notably nationalistic.  
This nationalistic outlook dissipated and became instead, a dual focus on not just South 
Carolina, but the entire American South. The question remains, why did John C. Calhoun’s rhetoric 
shift from nationalism to sectionalism? In a rapidly changing union where each individual state 
protected their own interests, sectionalism was not uncommon, but certainly not to the degree in which 
Calhoun advocated for disunion in the mid-19th century. The easy answer is to label Calhoun as a 
political extremist who pushed for the nullification of federal law and in part, set the wheels in motion 
for the American Civil War. However, that diminishes the influence that earlier statesmen had on “the 
South’s favorite son” when it came to secessionist ideology.  
During the 19th century, nullification was advocated by Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and a 
collective of New England’s elite. Nullification and secessionism were not the extremist ideas of a 
Southerner obsessed with sectionalism, but viable political tools that other American politicians had 
used in the past. At this point in American history the question always arose; is the United states a 
unified country, or a collection of states joined together by a confederacy. Those who ascribed to the 
latter interpretation of the “American experiment” contended that a state should only remain in the 
Union if their best interests were protected. John C. Calhoun adopted this ideological point and used it 
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to (in his mind) protect South Carolina’s interests. The Constitution and the American peoples 
generally accepted interpretation of the governmental structure of the United States is what spurred on 
the American Civil War, not the acts of one Southern intellectual.  
To fully understand Calhoun’s shift from nationalism to sectionalism, his early years are of the 
same importance as his time in public office. Born in 1782 in lowland South Carolina, Calhoun learned 
from a young age that hard work and an observance to the Almighty is what made a man (much like 
Federalists in New England). The future vice-president’s cool demeanor can be attributed to his father. 
Patrick Calhoun was a notable planter and surveyor who was chosen by his peers to represent South 
Carolina’s backcountry in Charleston. From a young age, John C. Calhoun was surrounded by not only 
political dealings, but America’s “peculiar institution”. His father owned a large farm that housed over 
30 slaves, making the Calhoun family one of the largest slave-owning families outside of Charleston.132 
At a young age John C. Calhoun was conditioned to accept, and even be an advocate for slavery; a 
young boy in the backcountry of South Carolina could not have helped but notice the prestige and 
community standing that came with the ownership of African slaves. The young man often found 
himself working side by side with his fathers’ slaves, and was taught that only those with the highest 
moral ability could own another human.  
 In the political sphere, Patrick Calhoun was a staunch supporter of his home state of South 
Carolina and prescribed to 18th century Republicanism. The elder Calhoun was known for his 
conservatism and almost puritanical lifestyle, and this undoubtedly shaped his son’s demeanor as well. 
Republican virtue was adhered to in the Calhoun family, and historian Irving Bartlett states that John, 
“...remembered his father telling him that a good government protected society while preserving 
maximum liberty for the individual.”133 This statement is evidence enough to explain Calhoun’s later 
views of the construct of the American government as a whole.  The elder Calhoun believed that the 
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executive had too much power, and that no citizen should be indiscriminately ruled by men hundreds of 
miles away. Young John C. Calhoun learned that local representatives and the state itself should in most 
cases, be the final authority on political matters. 
 When Patrick Calhoun passed in 1796, he left his sons with a thriving estate and a large 
collection of slaves.134 Perhaps his father’s death is what propelled John C. Calhoun to take a more 
serious “cast-iron” approach to the world, as his childhood evolved into manhood rather quickly. Told 
from a young age that only those with the highest moral character and observance to God were worthy 
of being slave owners, Calhoun quickly adapted to his new life as head of the household. His time in 
the fields was character building, but even from a young age, his talents for the arts were noted. Out of 
all of Patrick Calhoun’s sons, John was tasked with carrying on his father’s political legacy. Notably 
smart and dogmatic, John C. Calhoun’s interest in politics may have started well before he entered the 
political sphere. A well-marked copy of the South Carolina Gazette reporting the proceedings of 
Congress in 1798 suggests that Calhoun was already dissecting political documents at 16 years old.135  
 John C. Calhoun stayed home to maintain the farm his father had built until the day his siblings 
came to him with a proposition; they offered to watch the estate and provide him a stipend to receive a 
formal education, as he was the most intellectually talented in the family. Thus far, it is clear that 
Calhoun was raised in a household that was both pro-slavery and pro-Republican; this tie to Jefferson’s 
republicanism laid the groundwork for Calhoun’s later use of the Virginia Resolution to bolster his own 
political rhetoric. Notably, the majority of Calhoun’s education took place in the Northern United 
States, an area that was becoming increasingly more hostile towards slavery and the Southern “way of 
life”. Calhoun chose to attend Yale University in 1802 and save from his roommate Christopher 
Edwards Gadsden (who hailed from Charleston), most of his classmates at Yale were markedly 
different from his friends in the South Carolina backcountry. Not only was the scenery dissimilar, but 
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this son of a Republican politician now found himself in Federalist territory. While the puritanical 
lifestyle attended to by many Federalists may have appealed to Calhoun, their political differences were 
obviously notable. Nonetheless, Calhoun disregarded personal political stances in hopes to obtain the 
most prestigious education he could.136  
 Calhoun’s hopes of receiving an education without running into troubles due to his Republican 
inclinations did not last long however, as he was one of the few students who supported Thomas 
Jefferson. His first political run-in came with the President of Yale himself, Timothy Dwight. Dwight 
was a staunch Federalist who disagreed strongly with the concepts of Republicanism, and always 
looked for ways to discredit the “vile” Thomas Jefferson.137 This oratorical challenge was the first true 
test of Calhoun’s ability to verbally spar.  
The topic was immigration, with Dwight subscribing to John Adams’s view that immigrants 
were nothing but a nuisance for the United States (Adams supported anti-immigration policies 
throughout his single term as President). While many of his fellow classmates agreed with this 
Federalist sentiment, Calhoun openly challenged the President of Yale in his own classroom. Calhoun 
was not only the son of a Republican, but his family immigrated from Scotland to South Carolina in the 
1700s. He argued that immigrants were mostly the middle-class, and that they were beneficial to the 
American economy. Before he concluded his point, he was cut off by Dwight who exclaimed that he 
was, “...decidedly against the importation of foreigners. No men leave their country (with a very 
moderate exception) except worthless characters!”138 This was Calhoun’s first taste of political battle, 
and the young South Carolinian handled himself surprisingly well. Seeing the dogmatic way in which 
Dwight defended his argument, undoubtedly spurred Calhoun to realize that to convert a listener, an 
argument must have tangible backing.  
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Later that same year, Dwight once again went out of his way to challenge his top student when 
he asked his classroom, “What’s the legitimate source of power?” Federalists were amongst the most 
God-fearing Americans, and the answer to this question in their minds was of course, God. Calhoun 
drew on Jefferson to claim that true power actually came from the people. Dwight acknowledged 
Calhoun’s intellectual prowess (even at a young age), and claimed that he had the potential, “to be 
President of the United States.”139 
The importance of Calhoun’s time at Yale was twofold; his time spent in a Federalist dominated 
area allowed him to become  more acquainted with their ideologies, and the realization hit that as a 
Jeffersonian he was an outcast of sorts in the Northeast.  After achieving higher education at Yale, the 
young intellectual was ready to pursue law. Calhoun believed law to be the most noble of pursuits,  
Upon what greater honour attend, than upon accurate and comprehensive 
knowledge of law? But why is this honour attendant on legal knowledge? 
Surely because it demands, a strong and comprehensive mind…Were the 
law so simple and concise as to be attainable by everyone, with moderate 
application and abilities, where would be the honour of its acquisition?140 
 
Federalist Yale had taught Calhoun to equate honor with triumphs of the mind and triumphs in oratory. 
This concept of honor in the mind of Calhoun, led to his defense of Southern “honor” in the years to 
come. At this point of his life however, nationalism had a hold on the cast-iron mind of the future 
Senator. Not yet had his political love affair with slavery and Southern rights started, and many of his 
writings expressed disdain for the debauchery of Southern port cities like Charleston. Upon returning to 
South Carolina to study law, Calhoun took note of the way daily life was conducted on the coast. To 
Calhoun, those who lived in Charleston were, “so extremely corrupt and particularly so inattentive to 
every call of religion…Surely no people ever so much needed a reform as those in the parishes near 
Charleston.” Quite the statement from the future defender of Southern rights. 
 
139 Calhoun, John C. Life of John C. Calhoun: Presenting a Condensed History of Political Events from 1811 to 1843 
Largely Written by Himself. Together with a Selection from His Speeches, Reports, and Other Writings, etc. With a Portrait. 
Hardpress Publishing, 2019. 
140 Calhoun, John C. Letter to Andrew Pickens, Jr. January 21, 1803. 
71 
 In any event, studying law opened Calhoun’s eyes to the true economic and social importance 
of slavery in the American South. Slaves were expensive, and cases involving manumission were 
exceedingly common. The true reason as to why Calhoun was dissatisfied with South Carolinians in 
Charleston was not solely their lack of morals, but their large slave population combined with that lack 
of morality. Morality, law and slaveholding were the three main sources of “honor” in the Calhoun 
family, and John prescribed to this method. Calhoun believed that in a city like Charleston where slaves 
outnumbered whites and made up the majority of the population, morality had to be held in the utmost 
regard.141  
This “morality” however, did not mean an exclusive aversion to vices to promote a more 
virtuous community. What it truly meant was that if slave masters were unruly, then how could the 
citizens of Charleston feel reassured that they were keeping their slaves in line? This is a distinct 
difference; morality was an attribute connected to slavery due to fear of insurrection, not common 
good. Calhoun was rooted in the “Southern way of life” from a young age, so it is no surprise that his 
later arguments were passionately pro-slavery. Republicanism was rooted in agriculture, and 
agrarianism in the United States went hand and hand with slavery.142 
In any event, John C. Calhoun was now one of the most educated men in South Carolina, both 
in the arts and law. Jefferson’s influence on Calhoun was telling, especially in the case of the USS 
Chesapeake mentioned earlier. Calhoun’s first step into the public eye was during Charleston’s 
deliberations following the unjust British attack. Republicans were distinctly Francophile and held 
considerable disdain for Great Britain. After being named to the courthouse committee, Calhoun wrote 
resolutions that were both inflammatory and decidedly anti-British.  
To defend America’s honor Calhoun suggested war, and continued to suggest war, up until it 
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was formally declared in 1812. In league with Henry Clay, the two became the de facto leaders of the 
American War Hawks (pro-war politicians). Those that longed for war in many cases, did so in an 
effort to prove that the second generation of American statesmen were just as honorable as their 
predecessors. With war came honor, and into the 1820s Calhoun’s ideology was still nationalistic, even 
with Jefferson’s concept of states’ rights engrained into his mind. 
To further understand Calhoun’s early nationalistic sentiment, many of his now-legendary 
oratories illustrate his pre-secessionist political theory. The most telling of these speeches that cements 
the young Calhoun as an anti-disunionist was his 1816 speech in support of the Dallas Tariff. In the 
years following the War of 1812, many Americans worried that war with Great Britain was bound to 
happen again as the two nations continued to expand. In an attempt to protect the manufacturing 
interests of the North, then Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Dallas proposed to levy a tariff on 
British imported goods.143 This was the first tariff of its kind; prior tariffs were focused more on 
government revenue than protecting American industry. In a break with more established Democratic-
Republican leaders like John Randolph of Roanoke, Calhoun spoke in favor of the tariff.  
The United States had just proven that the second generation of American statesmen could 
challenge Great Britain in terms of warfare, and the country itself was entering into the period known 
as The Era of Good Feelings.144 Even Calhoun, who later vehemently argued against protective tariffs, 
was swept up by the growing tide of nationalism in early 19th century America. Calhoun realized that 
the American economy relied on three main factors; agriculture, manufacturing and commerce all had 
to be protected. In 1816 Calhoun made note of this when he stated,  
If the mere statement of facts did not carry conviction to every mind, as he 
conceives it is calculated to do, additional arguments might be drawn from the 
general nature of wealth. Neither agriculture, manufactures, nor commerce, 
taken separately, is the cause of wealth; it flows from the three combined, and 
cannot exist without each. The wealth of any single nation or an individual, it is 
true, may not immediately depend on the three, but such wealth always 
presupposes their existence. He viewed the words in the most enlarged sense. 
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Without commerce, industry would have no stimulus; without manufactures, it 
would be without the means of production; and without agriculture, neither of 
the others can subsist. When separated entirely and permanently, they perish. 
War in this country produces, to a great extent, that effect; and hence the great 
embarrassment which follows in its train. The failure of the wealth and 
resources of the nation necessarily involved the ruin of its finances and its 
currency. It is admitted by the most strenuous advocates, on the other side, that 
no country ought to be dependent on another for its means of defence; that, at 
least, our musket and bayonet, our cannon and ball, ought to be of domestic 
manufacture. But what, he asked, is more necessary to the defence of a country 
than its currency and finance? Circumstanced as our country is, can these stand 
the shock of war?145 
 
Here Calhoun clearly defends the Northern manufacturing states at the expense of his own home state 
of South Carolina, as well as the surrounding Southern states. Many Southerners relied heavily on 
imported goods from Great Britain (homespun was deemed unfashionable by many), and a tariff was in 
many ways, taking money out of the hands of Southerners to help bolster the Northern economy.146 
Calhoun’s support for the tariff is rather shocking in retrospect, as a tariff less than 20 years later 
assisted in his constitutional theory shifting dramatically.  
Calhoun’s decision to support the manufacturing sector as emphatically as he did, was certainly 
a break from more traditional Republican thinking. Those who knew about Calhoun’s support of 
internal improvements and tariffs pre-1830 could not have possibly predicted how his political 
ideology shifted in the coming decades. At this point, his political career was skyrocketing, but his 
politics were distinctly non-Jeffersonian in many aspects. Jeffersonian thought was based on an 
agrarian economy, advocation of a small federal government, and states’ rights.  At this point and time, 
it would be fair to say that Calhoun’s political leaning could be interpreted as more Whiggish than 
Republican. As his stature grew however, his lust for the presidency continued to put him at odds with 
many fellow politicians.  
In the election of 1824, John C. Calhoun campaigned for the presidency in a crowded field that 
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included William H. Crawford, Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson. With his 
chances for success plummeting, Calhoun instead pursued the vice presidency (a somewhat symbolic 
role at the time, but a political steppingstone nonetheless.) John Quincy Adams, with the help of Henry 
Clay (who supported Adams in exchange for a cabinet position in what is now deemed the Corrupt 
Bargain) won the election and became the 6th President of the United States. His presidency was 
marred by inaction and an inability to garner support for Clay’s “American System” policies.147 
Calhoun however, seemingly remained out of the public eye and carried out his duties faithfully. This, 
as well as his nationalistic approach to politics all changed, however, when the results of the next 
election were revealed. 
So, the question arises, when did Calhoun make the shift from nationalism to sectionalism? It 
was not necessarily a single cataclysmic event, but the results of a friendship turned lifelong rivalry 
with Andrew Jackson. The seventh president was the most polarizing figure in the United States for 
approximately thirty years, and any who dared to cross him felt the wrath of “Old Hickory”. Calhoun’s 
first interaction with Jackson actually came before the general had even entered the political sphere. In 
1818 during the Seminole Wars, Andrew Jackson was tasked with defending American land around 
Florida while Spain deliberated on what to do with the territory. The United States’ main goal was to 
absorb Florida into the Union, and many Americans felt that if Spain could not properly defend the 
territory, they should relinquish it. An unclear letter from President Monroe to Jackson, who was 
patrolling the area surrounding Spanish Florida, accelerated the tension between the two nations even 
further. In his letter to Jackson, Monroe provided little instruction and essentially deferred the decision 
making to the general. 
 Acting in “defense of the United States”, Jackson invaded Spanish Florida and captured 
Pensacola from a small contingent of Spanish soldiers. When asked by his peers and enemies to defend 
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his actions, Jackson made it clear that he only invaded the territory as a defense measure against hostile 
Native Americans. While the whole situation became a moot point (Florida ceded Spain to the United 
States in 1819), Jackson was still heavily condemned by politicians for acting on his own accord. In 
response, his soon-to-become lifelong enemy Henry Clay advocated for a censorship of Jackson’s 
actions in Spanish Florida. This motion was seconded by none other than Jackson’s future Vice 
President, John C. Calhoun. 
Jackson never explicitly learned that Calhoun sided with Clay and considered the South 
Carolinian one of his closest political allies. When John Quincy Adams was defeated by Jackson in the 
1828 election, while Calhoun kept his position as Vice President. Both men were known for their fiery 
demeanor, but not even Jackson could have surmised that one of the catalysts to the fracture in their 
relationship came curtesy of Calhoun’s wife Floride. In a historical episode now dubbed the “Petticoat 
Affair”, Calhoun and Jackson officially parted ways, and Calhoun began to shift away from his more 
nationalistic ideology and flirt with sectionalism.148 
Peggy O’Neill was the daughter of a successful innkeeper in Washington, D.C. and was known 
as being especially flirtatious and talkative for an early 1800s American woman. At a young age she 
married John B. Timberlake (a member of the Navy), much to the dismay of her many potential suitors. 
Unfortunately, during an expedition in the Mediterranean Timberlake succumbed to pneumonia, 
leaving Peggy O’Neill widowed. The couple’s close friend and Secretary of War John Eaton, swiftly 
courted O’Neill and the two were married in less than nine months. In an American society still 
influenced heavily by Puritanical doctrine, one can surmise that this could be the reason that the Eatons 
were the subject of much criticism in Washington.  
The criticism was taken to new levels by the Vice President’s wife, Floride. Floride Calhoun 
was conservative even by 19th century standards, and she conspired against Peggy with the other 
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cabinet members’ wives. Not only was the mourning period in between marriages deemed 
unsatisfactory, but rumors of infidelity before Timberlake’s death ran rampant. Perhaps the most 
heinous charge against Peggy O’Neill was that her husband committed suicide while at sea after 
learning about his wife and John Eaton. Historians have agreed that there is no way to prove the 
validity of these claims, but their consequences were tremendous. John C. Calhoun and the majority of 
the cabinet sided against Eaton; Jackson and Van Buren sided with the couple in question. 
 Historians attribute Jackson’s adamant defense of Peggy O’Neill to the early death of his wife 
Rachel. When Jackson was running for president in 1828, pro-Adams newspapers ran stories claiming 
that Rachel married Andrew before her first marriage was officially annulled. Changing state lines and 
distance played a part; Rachel Jackson was dubbed as an adulterer and as a woman with low morals. 
The negative stories written about her caused her to be depressed and when she died of a heart attack in 
1828, Jackson accused the malicious actions of his political rivals as causing the death of his beloved 
Rachel. At her funeral the 8th president stated as such, "May God Almighty forgive her murderers, I 
never can."149 When Peggy O’Neil and her husband John Eaton faced the same backlash for their 
relationship, Old Hickory to no surprise took their side. His political ally Martin Van Buren was a 
bachelor, as well as a resourceful political tactician, and he knew his best chance at the presidency 
came with supporting the most popular man in America.150 The scene was set; Jackson and Van Buren 
versus the Calhouns.  
Three major events caused the division in Jackson’s cabinet; Jackson being censured during the 
Seminole War, the Petticoat Affair, and John C. Calhoun’s reaction to protective tariffs. Simultaneously 
while the Petticoat Affair was the gossip of America, the question of a new protective tariff provided 
even more speculation into the future of Jackson’s cabinet.  The fallout following the Tariff of 1828 is 
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where Calhoun’s venture into sectionalism first came to light. While earlier attempts at protective 
tariffs were supported by Calhoun, the general view of tariffs in the American South were negative. By 
the early to mid-1800s, the American South was rapidly developing its own economy and culture. 
Anything that came close to threatening the “Southern way of life” was immediately opposed. The 
“Tariff of Abominations” as it was dubbed, was no exception. Robert Y. Hayne and William C. Preston 
(two politicians that worked closely with Calhoun), asked the vice-president to prepare a report on the 
problems associated with the tariff. During the intermediary period between John Quincy Adams’s and 
Andrew Jackson’s presidency, John C. Calhoun (at the urging from his constituents in South Carolina) 
authored the South Carolina Exposition and Protest.  
The South Carolina Exposition and Protest highlighted the issues and concerns Southerners felt 
in regard to the tariff in question. In this relatively short piece, Calhoun’s penchant for political theory 
was on display. Calhoun’s reach did not permeate the Northern states, and the former vice-president 
realized that to win any sort of political battle he had to rely heavily on his Southern constituents. This 
is why Calhoun agreed to write this work in the first place, to make sure that his base voters would 
support him in upcoming elections. Essentially going against what the president, he was serving under, 
essentially confirmed that Calhoun was aligning with Southern interest at the expense of Northern or 
even Western votes. In the South Carolina Exposition and Protest, Calhoun opens by arguing that 
protecting one section at the expense of the another is not only wrong, but oppressive and 
unconstitutional. Strong words from the current Vice-President of the United States. 
 As a Republican, Calhoun was obviously familiar with Jeffersonian thought, and invoked the 
former president’s ideology throughout the Exposition. In a nod to Jefferson’s earlier writings, Calhoun 
discusses the role that “implied powers” had in levying a tariff. Just like his intellectual predecessor, 
Calhoun claimed that the authors of the tariff had provided no such justification confirming that the 
tariff was indeed, constitutional. Furthermore, Congress was only explicitly authorized to establish a 
tariff as a tax for revenue, not as protectionist measure. Calhoun calls this distinction an attack not on 
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the letter of the Constitution, but on the meaning. The vice-president made these stances clear when he 
wrote,  
The Constitution grants to Congress the power of imposing a duty on imports 
for revenue, which power is abused by being converted into an instrument of 
rearing up the industry of one section of the country on the ruins of another. The 
violation, then, consists in using a power granted for one object to advance 
another, and that by the sacrifice of the original object. It is, in a word, a 
violation by perversion, the most dangerous of all because the most insidious 
and difficult to resist.151 
 
Clearly in accordance with Jefferson, the strict Constitutionalism attributed to early Republican leaders 
is rampant throughout the Exposition. Calhoun believed that if the power was not explicitly granted, 
that it should not exist. Just as New Englanders began to hear the rumblings of secession in the 1810s, 
so did Southerners in the 1830s. Just like his political rivals in Hartford had down twenty plus years 
early, Calhoun never does more than hint at the prospect of secession. However, Calhoun flirts with the 
concept openly, something that the Federalists never dared to do.  
On entering on this branch of the subject [the inequality and oppression of the 
Tariff system], the committee feel the painful character of the duty which they 
must perform. They would desire never to speak of our country, as far as the 
action of the General Government is concerned, but as one great whole, having 
a common interest, which all the parts ought zealously to promote. Previously to 
the adoption of the Tariff system, such was the unanimous feeling of this State; 
but in speaking of its operation, it will be impossible to avoid the discussion of 
sectional interest, and the use of sectional language. On its authors, and not on 
us, who are compelled to adopt this course in self-defence, by injustice and 
oppression, be the censure.152  
 
The United States in itself, has always been sectional to some degree. Jefferson and Madison’s 
Resolutions were the first works to openly condemn an act taken up by the federal government. Their 
precedent emboldened Calhoun: if the founding fathers deemed nullification as a viable political tool 
then so should Americans in the 1830s.  
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 In Hartford, Federalists complained that a war with Great Britain was injurious to the entire 
American Northeast. Calhoun invoked the same sectional feelings pushed by the Essex Junto, and 
applied them to the situation in the American South. In an effort to conjure emotion from his 
constituents, the vice-president spoke of the glorious sun, fields and providence that God had given to 
the Southern states. If a tariff were to pass, Calhoun claimed that the South would, “languish in poverty 
and sink into decay”.153 Those that did not have the benefit of being Southern, were going to steal the 
property for themselves at the cost of widespread ruin below the Mason-Dixon line. The South would 
have been forced to cease its agrarian way of life according to Calhoun; agrarianism was not only an 
economic staple, but an important part of Southern culture. Calhoun framed the tariff as not only an 
attack on your business, but as an attack on your way of life as well. The Essex Junto and other 
Federalists used the same political technique during the years leading up to the War of 1812, when they 
invoked images of halted commerce and financial ruin. 
 Calhoun became the voice of the South throughout the later years of his political service; his 
advocation of states’ rights turned his nationalistic approach to politics into a sectionalist one. This was 
in part, due to Jefferson’s assertion that the United States was but a collection of individual states, not a 
singular country. Calhoun found his allegiance rested not with the country as a whole, but with South 
Carolina, a state that he watched his father serve when he was just a child.154 In his opinion, he was 
elected by the South Carolina legislature and therefore, it was his duty above all else, to protect the 
interests of his home state. On this platform, Calhoun continued in his Exposition by stating that the 
interests of the North did not line up with the South in any way. This is nothing but incendiary doctrine; 
purposefully used to create a stronger aversion to the tariff in question. In many ways, it’s the same 
sectional feeling invoked by Pickering and the Essex Junto in the early 19th century.  
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 Calhoun made it his goal to protect the minority from an “absolute majority”; the minority 
being his constituents in the South. Channeling Federalists decades earlier, Calhoun cast his support 
behind a section of the country that felt their voices were not being heard. Towards the end of his 
Exposition, the issue of country versus confederation yet again arises. Calhoun believed that since the 
states and federal government were technically two separate entities (Jeffersonian-style republicanism), 
that neither could encroach upon the other without it being deemed as unconstitutional. 
 Our system, then, consists of two distinct and independent Governments. The 
general powers, expressly delegated to the General Government, are subject to 
its sole and separate control; and the States cannot, without violating the 
constitutional compact, interpose their authority to check, or in any manner to 
counteract its movements, so long as they are confined to the proper sphere. So, 
also, the peculiar and local powers reserved to the States are subject to their 
exclusive control; nor can the General Government interfere, in any manner, 
with them, without violating the Constitution.155  
 
Again, this solidifies the clear effect that the doctrine of Jefferson and Madison had on Calhoun; strong states-
rights, a protection of the minority and a strict view of the Constitution. 
 To justify his support of states “checking” the power of the federal government, Calhoun offered this 
solution, “Is there danger, growing out of this division, that the State Legislatures may encroach on the powers of 
the general government? The authority of the Supreme Court is adequate to check such encroachments.” Using 
this system of checks and balances between the multiple “layers” of government in and of it itself is a positive 
idea, however Calhoun’s non-compromising application of this ideology is what was troublesome. His 
conclusion at the end of the South Carolina Exposition and Protest came to the same realization that Jefferson 
did in his Resolution; individual states have the right to interpose the federal government if such a drastic action 
was deemed appropriate.156 
 The tension between the president and vice-president reached a boiling point, as the two men were on 
opposite sides of the spectrum on all of the issues in question. To Calhoun, government existed by the consent of 
the governed, and his home state was certainly not interested in self-damaging legislation. To fully grasp 
Calhoun’s political ideology and how it was further inspired by prior nullifiers (as well as to finally understand 
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the final division between Jackson and Calhoun), two more significant speeches made by the vice-president must 
be considered. As South Carolina considered the notion of nullifying the “Tariff of Abominations”, John C. 
Calhoun doubled down on his states’ rights ideology in an address that he wrote at his Fort Hill plantation. 
Already famous for his oratorical talents, this piece solidified that his penchant for writing was just as 
impressive.  
While many Americans considered Constitutional theory as a topic best discussed in the Supreme Court, 
Calhoun believed ideological Constitutional discussion should be part of everyday political discourse.157 In his 
Address On the Relation Which the States and General Government Bear to Each Other, Calhoun fully expands 
on his interpretation and application of the United States’ Constitution. Calhoun testified at the beginning of this 
work that the concept in question (how the state and general government bear to each other), had not been solved 
yet, nor had it been solved at the nation’s conception. Even with the danger presented by the Essex Junto years 
earlier, there was still no answer as to what exactly the relationship was between the different levels of 
government. The Essex Junto came up short of their final goal (possible disunion), so the entire issue was 
essentially considered a moot point. Jefferson laid the groundwork, the Essex Junto propagated the ideas and 
eventually, Calhoun carried them out.  Within the first two pages of the Fort Hill Address (as it was alternatively 
dubbed), the vice-president solidified the thought that he shifted from a nationalist view to a more sectionalist 
one. When writing as to why some of his constituents in the South had their reservations about his public service 
record, he confirms his own shift in political thinking. “Nearly half of my life has been passed in the service of 
the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquired in indissolubly identified with. To be too national has, 
indeed, been considered by many, even my friends, my greatest political fault.”158 Here, Calhoun addressed his 
nationalistic past and clearly tries to separate himself from that earlier connotation. Shortly after this address, 
Calhoun and Jackson finally formally split and the Vice-President resigned from his post. The hope was that his 
staunch support of Southern rights could propel him to the presidency. 
The Great Triumvirate (Calhoun, Clay and Webster) always faced criticism in reference to their 
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overwhelming ambition, and how it in many cases, clouded their judgement.159 Was Calhoun putting his faith 
solely in his Southern constituents in hopes of securing a voter base for upcoming elections? The answer is 
unequivocally yes, however his family ties and father’s political stances suggest that his reasons for advocating 
nullification were indeed two-fold. Federalist leaders in the early 1800s also tried to consolidate power by 
targeting a marginalized group, and essentially the South served Calhoun the way New England served Pickering 
and Cabot. By the 1830s, Calhoun had become the “heir apparent” to the school of Jeffersonian thought. While 
many consider the Constitution to be a living, breathing document, the strict unwavering constitutional theory of 
Republicanism in the mid-19th century seems outlandish by today’s standards. By that notion, Calhoun made a 
claim in the early stages of his work that the doctrine of nullification was indeed, the cornerstone of the 
American government. This same argument was advanced by Jefferson and Madison, when they affirmed 
nullification’s place in American political doctrine. 
 Placing so much stock in one political ideology had two effects; below the Mason-Dixon line many 
Americans threw their support behind their fellow Southerner, and elsewhere the accusation of being an 
extremist was levied by his detractors. The parallels between this admonishment of the South, and the way 
Federalists were treated post-Hartford Convention are of note.  When explicitly discussing nullification, Calhoun 
wrote,  
I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of our system, and of the 
Union itself; and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the States the right 
of protecting their reserved powers, and which would vest in the General 
Government (it matters not through what department) the right of determining, 
exclusively and finally, the powers delegated to it, is incompatible with the 
sovereignty of the States, and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis 
of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger than that used 
by the illustrious Jefferson, who said, to give to the General Government the 
final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make "its discretion and not 
the Constitution, the measure of its powers;" and that, "in all cases of compact 
between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge 
for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress." 
Language cannot be more explicit, nor can higher authority be adduced.160 
 
This excerpt is most telling in regard to Calhoun’s personal viewpoint on the functionality of the 
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United States Constitution. Not only does he acknowledge that nullification is indeed a part of the 
American political experiment, he claims that it is solely the most important part of our government’s 
structure. The protection of states’ rights to Calhoun, should have been at the forefront of American 
thought. To further back up his claim, Thomas Jefferson is yet again cited as being the true author of 
this doctrine.  Jefferson was the perfect politician to constantly cite, as he was given almost god-like 
status by some of his constituents. This is clearly evidence in and of itself, that the concept of 
interposition that Jefferson used forty years prior to disrupt John Adams’s presidency, had longer 
lasting effects than perhaps even he was aware of. Jefferson advanced this concept to belittle John 
Adams, yet the third president was clearly a unionist. Calhoun claimed that Jefferson was indeed the 
highest authority when discussing constitutional theory (expected claim from a staunch Republican), 
and that nullification must obviously be constitutional if Jefferson himself backed it.161  
Trained in classical history and literature as all early American statesmen were, Calhoun 
compared the current state of the North and South to the city-states of Sparta and Athens. By this 
notion, Calhoun attempted to explain how in all societies there exists a variety of opinions. These 
differing opinions (when channeled correctly) should be used as a system of checks and balances. 
Retrospectively, Calhoun should have paid closer attention; Sparta and Athens took up arms to settle 
their issues, a fate that the union faced less than thirty years after this address. However, just how 
Sparta and Athens both had their own geographical pros (one being a naval power, the other a land 
power) so to, did the United States. Differing interests over such a large physical area (shipping, 
farming, manufacturing) in the United States is what led to contest, exactly like in Ancient Greece. If 
the city-states of classical Greece had separate governments, the United States should as well. Calhoun 
made this comparative analysis between the two “countries” known when he wrote,  
So numerous and diversified are the interests of our country, that they 
could not be fairly represented in a single government, organized so as to 
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give to each great and leading interest a separate and distinct voice, as in 
governments to which I have referred. A plan was adopted better suited to 
our situation, but perfectly novel in its character. The powers of 
government were divided, not, as heretofore, in reference to classes, but 
geographically. One General Government was formed for the whole, to 
which were delegated all the powers supposed to be necessary to regulate 
the interests common to all the States, leaving others subject to the 
separate control of the States, being, from their local and peculiar 
character, such that they could not be subject to the will of a majority of 
the whole Union, without the certain hazard of injustice and 
oppression.162 
 
 The emphasis placed on geography is similar to the issues voiced by Federalists and the Essex 
Junto during the Hartford Convention. Could a country survive with such a diverse set of goals and 
cultures? The fact that Calhoun studied at Yale, and was exposed to New England’s Federalist doctrine, 
one can surmise that he was at least familiar with the more extremist ideologies presented by the Essex 
Junto. One of their main reasons for pushing a secessionist agenda was their problem with how large 
the United States had grown. The one caveat that existed from the start of the “American experiment”, 
were the problems that existed due to trying to govern a nation as sizable as the United States. The 
Essex Junto disliked both the West and the South, and this sectionalist attitude was adopted by 
Calhoun.163 
 Jefferson and other early leaders advocated for state governments to maintain order across the 
whole of North America. Calhoun once gain channels his predecessors by essentially stating that states 
are almost too unique to be homogenously organized under any one specific umbrella. In a unified 
nation, portions of the country that are negatively affected by legislation must rely on the democratic 
nature of the American government (voting) to ensure certain trespasses will not happen again. This 
sentiment is shared with how New Englanders and the Essex Junto felt thirty years prior. On the reverse 
and as Calhoun advocated for, if each state were given their own “veto” power, then the voice of the 
minority would always be protected. Calhoun believed that democratic choice should be extended to 
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those who need it, regardless of if their policies were defeating using the proper and necessary 
channels. 
 To defend his claim that it is truly the states that hold the power over the Federal government 
Calhoun wrote,  
So far from extreme danger, I hold that there never was a free State in which 
this great conservative principle, indispensable to all, was ever so safely lodged. 
In others, when the co-estates representing the dissimilar and conflicting 
interests of the community came into contact, the only alternative was 
compromise, submission, or force. Not so in ours. Should the General 
Government and a State come into conflict, we have a higher remedy: the power 
which called the General Government into existence, which gave it all its 
authority, and can enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers at its pleasure, may be 
invoked. The States themselves may be appealed to,- -three fourths of which, in 
fact, form a power, whose decrees are the Constitution itself, and whose voice 
can silence all discontent. The utmost extent, then, of the power is, that a State, 
acting in its sovereign capacity as one of the parties to the constitutional 
compact, may compel the Government, created by that compact, to submit a 
question touching its infraction, to the parties who created it; to avoid the 
supposed dangers of which, it is proposed to resort to the novel, the hazardous, 
and, I must add, fatal project of giving to the General Government the sole and 
final right of interpreting the Constitution;--thereby reversing the whole system, 
making that instrument the creature of its will, instead of a rule of action 
impressed on it at its creation, and annihilating, in fact, the authority which 
imposed it, and from which the Government itself derives its existence.164 
  
In many ways, this view of the governmental structure of the United States is virtually taking the “last 
resort” option of nullification advocated by Jefferson and applying it to the general government as a 
normal and expected political weapon. Even in the early 1800s this ideology was deemed at best 
troublesome, and at worst extremist. Nonetheless, the fact remains that it was still a crucial part of 
American democracy, even if public sentiment was negative.  
 John C. Calhoun’s political career reached new heights in the 1830s and 1840s, but the 
Executive’s Office continued to elude his grasp. From 1832 to 1843, Calhoun served in the United 
States Senate and remained relatively independent (preferring instead to focus his attention on South 
Carolina). The first year of his tenure in the Senate, yet another sectionalist quarrel broke out between 
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the North and South. In what is now dubbed as the “Nullification Crisis”, Southerners fought back 
against what they deemed to be an unjust tariff (much like the Tariff of 1828). Calhoun’s decision to 
relinquish the Vice Presidency and become a Senator of South Carolina gave him the opportunity to 
speak freely in defense of his home state.  
While the Tariff of 1832 was more widely accepted (even in parts of the South), South Carolina 
still strongly opposed its implementation. A convention was held in which delegates from South 
Carolina channeled the points made in Calhoun’s South Carolina Exposition and Protest and put them 
to use. On November 24th, 1832 the convention (headed by Calhoun and Robert Y. Hayne), voted 136 
to 26 to adopt the measures of nullification. The Ordinance of Nullification claimed that the recently 
implemented tariff was “null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citizens.”165 
Furthermore, the Ordinance essentially claimed that even if force were used, South Carolina would not 
back down, “We will not submit to the application of force, on the part of the Federal Government, to 
reduce this State to obedience.”166 The similarities between the Ordinance of Nullification, and the 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, are undeniable. An executive order was once again being 
challenged by a state, and the Federal Government’s power was once again in question. 
This time however, the executive took a much stronger stance than John Adams did in the late 
18th century. Already a devoted enemy of Calhoun, Andrew Jackson was a staunch unionist, and what 
was happening in South Carolina undoubtedly made “Old Hickory’s” blood boil. Less than a month 
after the start of the Nullification Crisis, Jackson issued a warning to the people of South Carolina that 
asserted the power of the Federal Government, warning that “disunion by armed force, is treason”.167 
With armed conflict seemingly about to erupt, compromise or war were the only two options. At this 
juncture, Calhoun chose the route of compromise and worked with Senator Henry Clay to construct the 
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Compromise Tariff of 1833 (the new tariff promised a slow decrease in taxes over the next decade). On 
the same day that the Compromise Tariff was proposed, Jackson issued the Force Bill, a bill that gave 
him the authority to send the military into South Carolina if they did not comply with the federally 
mandated tariff. Luckily the Compromise Tariff was accepted, and military intervention was avoided, 
but again this was simply another quick compromise that did not settle the issue of who had ultimate 
authority in the United States. South Carolina still believed themselves to be autonomous, and actually 
nullified the Force Bill out of principle (although they did not have to since a compromise was already 
reached).168 
 His departure from the cabinet and his role in the nullification crisis caused Calhoun’s 
popularity across the United States (save for South Carolina and parts of the South) to plummet. While 
other anti-Jackson politicians banded together to form the Whig Party, but Calhoun’s stance on 
nullification alienated him from Whig elites. In a last-ditch effort to hopefully reach the coveted 
executive office, Calhoun supported President Van Buren’s plan for an independent treasury. Jackson 
had killed the National Bank, and this alternative was proposed by Democrats after the Panic of 1837. 
Calhoun had now positioned himself between both the Whig and Democratic Party, and in 1843 he 
decided to push for the Democratic nomination. The problem was that Calhoun (like today), was 
associated with one singular goal, possible secession. With no support anywhere outside of his home 
state of South Carolina, Calhoun withdrew from the race.169 
 The former senator did not have to wait long for another opportunity for political glory; he was 
named John Tyler’s Secretary of State in 1844 following Abel S. Upshur’s death at the hands of a 
malfunctioning cannon on the USS Princeton.170 Following the USS Princeton tragedy, the nation was 
still clamoring for answers in regard to the “Texas Question”. Americans were split as to whether they 
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wanted to annex Texas and incorporate it into the union. President John Tyler was a notable nationalist, 
and attributed his want for Texas to American nationalism. Calhoun on the other hand, viewed the 
Texas situation in a much more sectional fashion. If slavery had come to Texas, slave states would have 
had an advantage in the United States government. Americans knew the risk proposed by a possible 
extension of slavery, and the Senate rejected Tyler’s attempt to annex Texas. Many at the time, were 
wary of Calhoun’s role in the deliberations. Calhoun had communicated to the British that slavery 
would exist in Texas, and there was nothing they could do about it. Americans knew that his views 
were not congruent with a unified nation. In many ways, Calhoun faced the same criticism that 
Timothy Pickering did years before. Both men were synonymous with being anti-unionist and in many 
ways, became the main example of secession for most Americans.171 
John Tyler’s attempt to annex Texas may have failed, but with the election of James K. Polk 
(who Calhoun identified as pro-slavery and openly supported), the process of annexation was renewed. 
Texas was officially annexed December 29th, 1845 and shortly after, Calhoun found himself at odds 
with the same man he had just supported, James K. Polk. Mexico were the rightful owners of Texas and 
after the United States annexed the area, war broke out. Polk was an expansionist and saw the 
Mexican-American War as another opportunity to gain territory, a sentiment that Calhoun felt was 
incompatible with republicanism.172 
 Here is perhaps one of the few examples where Calhoun’s political leanings did not follow his 
predecessors. Even those who prescribed to sectionalist ideology before him (Jefferson, Madison, 
Pickering), were proponents of expansionism, whether it be the American west or the whole of Canada. 
This divergence is of note, but Calhoun could not halt the coming war and with the singing of the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, The United States now had access to thousands of acres of unsettled 
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land. California, Arizona, Utah, Colorado, Nevada and parts of New Mexico were now under the 
jurisdiction of the United States, and the issue of slavery in new territories arose yet again.  
Southerners and Northerners realized that the only way to avoid armed conflict was 
compromise. An omnibus bill chiefly authored by Henry Clay was proposed, and became known as the 
Compromise of 1850. The provisions contained in the compromise were that California was to be 
admitted as a free state, the New Mexico and Utah territories were to be organized, the introduction of 
the fugitive slave act, Texas dropped its claim to New Mexico in exchange for 10 million dollars, and 
the slave trade was abolished in the District of Columbia. Slavery advocates found the bill to be 
inadequate, and many turned to Calhoun for an answer.173 
In response to the proposed Compromise of 1850, Calhoun channeled his predecessors yet gain, 
and organized a convention to discuss the measures. Dubbed the Nashville Convention, delegates from 
9 slave states met in Tennessee to discuss the possibility of secession if slavery was not properly 
protected.174 The Nashville Convention followed path very similar to the earlier Hartford Convention. 
Some of the attendees were rather extremist, pushing for secession and pinning the blame on the 
Northerner’s distaste for their “peculiar institution”. Like the Hartford Convention however, moderate 
voices prevailed, and drastic action was never taken. Calhoun warned his constituents that the balance 
of power had shifted, but his pleas fell on deaf ears. The similarities between Calhoun’s role at the 
Nashville Convention and the Essex Junto’s role at the Hartford Convention are undeniably profound. 
At this juncture however, Calhoun was a sick with tuberculosis and could not deliver his own speeches 
on the matter. In retrospect, perhaps if he were healthy and had the full array of his oratorical talents on 
display, the American Civil War may have occurred earlier. 
The Compromise of 1850 was eventually passed, and Calhoun died due to complications from 
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tuberculosis shortly after. His physical death did not mark the true end of Calhoun’s influence however, 
as his secessionist ideologies (which he procured from earlier statesmen), were passed down to 
Southern politicians. Calhoun was successful in passing on the idea that secession was a protected right 
under the Constitution.  As historian William Barney put it, "appealing to Southerners concerned with 
preserving slavery. ...Southern radicals known as 'Fire-eaters' pushed the doctrine of states' rights to its 
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Conclusion: A Retrospective Look at Nullification, Interposition and Secession 
Once again, Calhoun is many times seen as solely responsible for bringing secessionist ideology 
to mainstream American politics. Evidence shows that while he may have been the main voice of 
interposition, he was not solely responsible for the feelings shared by Southerners leading up to the 
Civil War. Calhoun’s leanings became inherently sectional in the 1830s, and this was only three 
decades after Jefferson and Madison first advocated for nullification. These early attempts by Jefferson 
and Madison were still fresh in the minds of American politicians. If there was no mention of said 
ideologies until Calhoun’s rise to national prominence, then a case could be made that he was its sole 
proponent. This is not the case however, as multiple secessionist plots were undertaken numerous times 
during that time period. Burr, Pickering and the Essex Junto’s plots clearly show that Calhoun’s 
ideologies were not as unique as perhaps some are inclined to believe. 
 All of the plots shared many things in common, distinctly, a defense of the minority against the 
“tyranny” of the majority. Whether it was in response to unfair presidential decrees, an unwanted war, 
or an infringement on a group’s “way of life”, secessionism and nullification have been concepts in 
American politics since the very beginning. The argument could even be made that the United States 
was originally formed from Great Britain using many of the concepts above. While markedly different 
in certain ways, the colonists were again, a minority group choosing to disregard the government they 
lived under in an attempt to gain more true control of their political dealings. The same ideologies 
pushed by secessionists in the 19th century were seen as patriotic less than a century before during the 
American Revolution. In the case of the Essex Junto and the Hartford Convention, they came about in 
the original hotbed of patriotism (New England), and took many cues from their forefathers, yet were 
viewed negatively by their contemporaries.  
While the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions respectively laid the groundwork for Calhoun’s 
later political discourse, the plots proposed by the Essex Junto is what truly brought secessionism to the 
forefront. The similarities between the political ideology of those present at the Hartford Convention 
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and John C. Calhoun can not be overstated. Both parties believed their way of life was being threatened 
(global trade and slavery), and both used the shield of religion to justify their wants. Federalist 
clergymen advocated for secession the same way that Southern preachers defended slavery to the bitter 
end. Even further, New Englanders and Southerners both went as far as to have separate conventions 
whose proceedings teetered close to disunion. 
So where does the disconnect occur, regarding Calhoun’s placement in history as the true author 
of secessionism? At times, Calhoun even referred to Jefferson as the true “Father of Nullification”. 
Again, this paper is in no way a defense of Calhoun’s role in perpetuating slavery and spurring the 
Civil War, but it would be a historical disservice to simplify interposition’s role in American history. 
With the abolition of slavery and the South’s defeat, Northerners placed the blame for the Civil War on 
their neighbors below the Mason-Dixon Line. In this vein, Northerners accused the South (and 
Calhoun) as being the major architects behind secession, as if it were a unique idea.  
The truth behind the secessionist ideology that exists in the United States, is that it is a direct 
result of early politicians’ decision to not fully identify the true nature of the union. Founders like 
Madison and Jefferson themselves never took a hard stance; both served as President of the United 
States, yet both still advocated for nullification. It took a civil war to determine that our compact is 
indivisible, and not a loose collection of autonomous states who could choose to leave the Union if they 
saw fit. Calhoun was undoubtedly the focal voice for secessionism in the mid-1800s, but his rhetoric 
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